### **Spec---1NC**

#### **Plan must specify the details of antitrust reform in these four areas: 1) antitrust standards, 2) enforcement, 3) remedies, and 4) exceptions**

**AMC 7** (Antitrust Modernization Commission, Deborah A. Garza Chair, Jonathan R. Yarowsky Vice-Chair, Bobby R. Burchfield, W. Stephen Cannon, Dennis W. Carlton, Makan Delrahim, Jonathan M. Jacobson, Donald G. Kempf, Jr., Sanford M. Litvack, John H. Shenefield, Debra A. Valentine, John L. Warden, April, 2007,<https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pdf>, y2k)

The charge to this **Commission** has been to **study**, **evaluate**, and **make recommendations** for the **antitrust** landscape as it now exists, much changed from earlier years. The current antitrust panorama, of course, covers **a broad array of issues**; to study **all** of the possible issues would be **neither efficient** nor **desirable**. To use its resources most **productively**, the Commission chose to focus on **four** primary areas: **substantive standards** of antitrust law; **enforcement institutions** and processes; civil and criminal **remedies**; and statutory and other **exceptions** to competition (such as immunities and exemptions from the antitrust laws). The Chapters that address these issues are briefly described below.

#### **Vagueness is a voting issue---causes 2AC sandbagging and kills effective implementation, which turns the case**

**Jones 20** (Alison Jones, Professor of Law, King's College London, Antitrust’s Implementation Blind Side: Challenges to Major Expansion of U.S. Competition Policy, 3-20, The Antitrust Bulletin. 2020;65(2):227-255. doi:10.1177/0003603X20912884, y2k)

In this article, we do not debate the condition of competition in the U.S. economy, nor do we assess the **substantive merits** of the respective measures proposed to **correct the market** and **policy deficiencies** identified. Instead, we focus on a less noticed issue—**the policy implementation challenges** that stand between the soaring reform **aspirations** and their **effective realization** in practice. We thus take the reform recommendations—presented in scholarly papers, blue-ribbon studies, and in popular essays—at face value, and ask what legislators and policy makers must do to land them. For example, assuming that more aggressive antitrust enforcement is required, how can an effective program actually be delivered—through winning antitrust cases and securing positive change—and how can it be delivered well?

In our view, these “**implementation” issues** have tended to be **overlooked** in the modern critique and to have been **too quickly side-lined** as technical **details** to be (easily) addressed once the **high-level concepts of a bold antitrust program** have been settled.21 Implementation is **not**, **however**, a simple matter that will necessarily **sort itself out** once the intellectual architecture is in place. Rather, **inattention to implementation challenges** invites **serious disappointment** by creating a **chasm** between elevated policy commitments and the **capacity** of responsible public institutions (competition agencies, new regulators, and the courts) to produce **expected** outcomes. This is the implementation blindside. Unless ~~the blindside~~ [the weak spot] is **acknowledged** and **addressed**, there is a **significant risk** that a major reform program will engage considerable resources, public and private, in initiatives that fall well short of their goals. Instead of restoring confidence in the ability of government agencies to **enforce antitrust laws effectively**, **a failed effort might merely reinforce doubts**, and cynicism, about the quality of public administration.

#### **The consensus of experts say specifying the four areas is good for a focused discussion**

**Masoudi 7** (Gerald F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant **Attorney** General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, REFLECTIONS ON THE ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 9-5,<https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/reflections-antitrust-modernization-commission-report-and-recommendations>, y2k)

The latest round of review by the **A**ntitrust **M**odernization **C**ommission yielded a body of carefully considered recommendations. Many of these recommendations reflect a broad **consensus** among **antitrust experts** about changes, clarifications, or legislative action that have been long overdue. Other recommendations emerged out of a **focused discussion** of the most significant challenges to antitrust, and whether antitrust law can continue to protect consumers and competition in the face of new business practices, structural change in the economy, and constantly evolving approaches to regulation and intellectual property, among other things. Some of the AMC's recommendations concern the Antitrust Division's enforcement activities as well as those of the Federal Trade Commission. As the Division continues to consider the AMC's recommendations, my observations today represent our current thinking on these issues.

The AMC's report organized its recommendations along **four broad areas**: **Substantive Standards** of Antitrust Law, **Enforcement Institutions** and Processes, Civil and Criminal **Remedies**, and Government **Exceptions** to Free-Market Competition. I would like to discuss several of the general and specific recommendations, especially as they relate to the Division's recent priorities: competition advocacy on immunities and exemptions, criminal enforcement, increasing the transparency and efficiency of merger review, and clarifying enforcement under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

#### **Prefer AMC report---**

#### **1---It outlines core controversies in antitrust**

**Foer 9** (Albert A. Foer, President, The American Antitrust Institute, Washington, DC, The Antitrust Modernization Commission: A retrospective from the perspective of the American Antitrust Institute, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 54, No. 2/Summer 2009 : 305, y2k)

Second, **the AMC Report** should prove **useful** both to historians and to foreign jurisdictions that are shaping their own competition policies, simply by **documenting** in **detail** many of the **controversies** that have troubled **American antitrust** during the early part of the twenty-first century. They can take or leave what is recommended, but they can benefit by having the **controversies** explored in a **clear** and **competent manner**. **Much credit** goes to the **staff** as they provided the background for the recommendations voted upon by the commissioners. Hopefully, the AMC Web site, www.amc.gov, will be maintained for a long time, because it provides a **wealth** of information for **researchers** and **policy advocate**

**2---it’s the most detailed report on antitrust**

**Freed 7** (Charles Freed, Partner in Thompson Hine LLP, and an associate editor of Antitrust, The Antitrust Modernization Commission - If It Ain't Broke, Antitrust 7, Bluebook 21st ed, https://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-bin/get\_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/antitruma20&section=51&casa\_token=FOmqQYKmer8AAAAA:6D5og6-3KDcbx6DOGKm1rfRGd73IDUcvep7wDOGcgxYwlZyuXLimEcRHlKBk4uMOX5n7h2sA, y2k)

So, in the end, were the Commission's efforts worth **three years**, **$4 million**, **countless hours** of hearings and deliberations, and almost **200** sets of **comments?** For those looking for fireworks, the Commission's results are probably disappointing. For those looking for a report that **thoughtfully** examines the **antitrust** laws and the state of antitrust enforcement in the United States, and suggests needed **corrections** and improvements at the margins, the Commission's work product looks just about **right**. It obviously is too early to tell whether the Report will have any real impact on antitrust law. Those recommendations that can be implemented by agency action alone may have a reasonably good prospect of coming to fruition. Those that require congressional action may take far longer and may never happen (e.g., repeal of the Robinson-Patman Act). Still, it is hard to argue with the concept of periodically reviewing our core laws to determine if they are still working as intended. The Commission did a great service in **thoroughly** and **thoughtfully** performing this task in an **open** and **non-partisan manner.**

#### **3---it’s a key reference point**

**Nelson 4** (Douglas C. Nelson, J.D. candidate, May 2005, Loyola University Chicago School of Law, Antitrust Modernization Commission Goes to Work, 17 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 121, y2k)

While the AMC was passed with little fanfare, the Commission's impact could be **substantial** and may be affected as much by the scope of its investigation, as by changes in the economic condition in the next three years before the Commission's report is due.2 2 If the economy slips into depression, if international deputes between antitrust regimes worsen, if intellectual property rights expand and become perceived as anticompetitive, or if state and federal antitrust enforcers continue to clash, then the Commission's **report** and **recommendations** may come at a time when U.S. antitrust law is **ripe for change**. Indeed, even if the Commission's report fails to have an immediate impact, it should provide **a valuable reference point** as new antitrust legislation is **contemplated** in the more distant future.

### **Black Nihilism K**

#### **The middle passage created a void of relationality distinct from events where black folk stood as socially dead IN RELATION to the rest of the world cementing a new order of signification that relies upon anti-black value systems**

**Wilderson 10** Frank B, Prof of African American studies and drama @ UC Irvine, [“Red White and Black Cinema and the Structure of U.S Antagonisms”]//Mberhe

**During the emergence of new ontological relations in the modern world, from the late Middle Ages through the 1500s, many different kinds of people experienced slavery. In other words, there have been times when natal alienation, general dishonor, and gratuitous violence have turned individuals of myriad ethnicities and races into beings who are socially dead. But the African, or more precisely Blackness, is the moniker for an individual who is by definition always already void of relationality. Thus, modernity marks the emergence of a new ontology** because it is an era in which an entire race of people who, a priori, that is prior to the contingency of the “transgressive act” (such as losing at war or being convicted of a crime), **stand as socially dead in relation to the rest of the world**. This, I will argue, is as true for those who were herded onto the slave ships as it is for those who had no knowledge whatsoever of the coffles. In this period, chattel slavery, as a condition of ontology and not just as an event of experience, stuck to the African like Velcro. To the extent that we can think the essence of Whiteness and the essence of Blackness, **we must think their essences through the structure of the Master/Slave relation.** It should be clear by now that I am not only drawing a distinction between what is commonly thought of as the Master/Slave relation and the constituent elements of the Master/Slave relation (Patterson 6), but I am also drawing a distinction between the experience of slavery (which anyone can be subjected to) and the ontology 28 Red, White, & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms of slavery, which in Modernity (the years 1300 to the present) becomes the singular purview of the Black. In this period, slavery is cathedralized. It “advances” from a word which describes a condition that anyone can be subjected to, to a word which reconfigures the African body into Black flesh. Far from being merely the experience of the African, slavery is now the African’s access to (or, more correctly, banishment from) ontology.

#### **Anti-blackness is defined by negative semantics structuring metaphysics forcing a parasitic relationship between anti-black violence and the world such that meaning and communication require robbing the black of being**

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This brilliant analysis compels us to rethink political rationality and the value in “means”—as a structuring agent by itself. What I would like to think through, however, is the distinction between “hope” and “despair” and “expectations” and “object.” Whereas Farred understands political participation as an act without a political object, or recognizable outcome—without an “end,” if we think of “end” and “object” as synonyms—I would suggest that the Politics of Hope reconfigures despair and expectation so that black political action pursues an impossible object. We can describe this contradictory object as the lure of metaphysical political activity: every act brings one closer to a “not-yet-social order.” What one achieves, then, and expects is “closer.” The political object that black participation encircles endlessly, like the Lacanian drive and its object, is the idea of linear proximity—we can call this “progress,” “betterment,” or “more perfect.” This idea of achieving the impossible allows one to disregard the historicity of anti-blackness and its continued legacy and conceive of political engagement as bringing one incrementally closer to that which does not exist—one’s impossible object. In this way, the Politics of hope recasts despair as possibility, struggle as triumph, and lack as propinquity. This impossible object is not tethered to real history, so it is unassailable and irrefutable because it is the object of political fantasy. The politics of hope, then, constitutes what Lauren Berlant would call **“cruel optimism” for blacks** (Berlant 2011). It **bundles certain promises about redress, equality, freedom, justice, and progress into a political object that always lies beyond reach.** The objective of the Political is to keep blacks in a relation to this political object—in an unending pursuit of it. This pursuit, however, is detrimental because it strengthens the very anti-black system that would pulverize black being. The pursuit of the object certainly has an “irrational” aspect to it, as Farred details, but it is not mere means without expectation; instead, it is a means that undermines the attainment of the impossible object desired. In other words, the pursuit marks a cruel attachment to the means of subjugation and the continued widening of the gap between historical reality and fantastical ideal. Black nihilism is a “demythifying” practice, in the Nietzschean vein, that uncovers the subjugating strategies of political hope and de-idealizes its fantastical object. Once we denude political hope of its axiological and ethical veneer, we see that it operates through certain strategies: 1) positing itself as the only alternative to the problem of anti-blackness, 2) shielding this alternative from rigorous historical/philosophical critique by placing it in an unknown future, 3) delimiting the field of action to include only activity recognized and legitimated by the Political, and 4) demonizing critiques or different philosophical perspectives. The politics of hope masks a particular cruelty under the auspices of “happiness” and “life.” It terrifies with the dread of “no alternative.” “Life” itself needs the security of the alternative, and, through this logic, life becomes untenable without it. Political hope promises to provide this alternative—a discursive and political organization beyond extant structures of violence and destruction**.** The construction of the binary “alternative/no-alternative” ensures the hegemony and dominance of political hope within the ontoexistential horizon. The terror of the “no alternative”—the ultimate space of decay, suffering, and death—depends on two additional binaries: “problem/ solution” and “action/inaction.” According to this politics, all problems have solutions, and hope provides the accessibility and realization of these solutions. The solution establishes itself as the elimination of “the problem”; the solution, in fact, transcends the problem and realizes Hegel’s aufheben in its constant attempt to sublate the dirtiness of the “problem” with the pristine being of the solution. No problem is outside the reach of hope’s solution— every problem is connected to the kernel of its own eradication. The politics of hope must actively refuse the possibility that the “solution” is, in fact, another problem in disguised form; the idea of a “solution” is nothing more than the repetition and disavowal of the problem itself. **The solution relies on what we might call the “trick of time” to fortify itself from the deconstruction of its binary. Because the temporality of hope is a time “not-yet-realized,” a future tense unmoored from present-tense justifications and pragmatist evidence, the** politics of hope cleverly shields its “solutions” from critiques of impossibility or repetition. Each insistence that these solutions stand up against the lessons of history or the rigors of analysis is met with the rationale that these solutions are not subject to history or analysis because they do not reside within the horizon of the “past” or “present.” Put differently, we can never ascertain the efficacy of the proposed solutions because they escape the temporality of the moment, always retreating to a “not-yet” and “could-be” temporality. This “trick” of time offers a promise of possibility that can only be realized in an indefinite future, and this promise is a bond of uncertainty that can never be redeemed, only imagined.In this sense, the politics of hope is an instance of the psychoanalytic notion of desire: its sole purpose is to reproduce its very condition of possibility, never to satiate or bring fulfillment. This politics secures its hegemony through time by claiming the future as its unassailable property and excluding (and devaluing) any other conception of time that challenges this temporal ordering. The politics of hope, then, depends on the incessant (re)production and proliferation of problems to justify its existence. Solutions cannot really exist within the politics of hope, just the illusion of a different order in a future tense. The “trick” of time and political solution converge on the site of “action.” In critiquing the politics of hope, one encounters the rejoinder of the dangers of inaction. “But we can’t just do nothing! We have to do something.” The "eld of permissible action is delimited and an unrelenting binary between action/ inaction silences critical engagement with political hope. These exclusionary operations rigorously reinforce the binary between action and inaction and discredit certain forms of engagement, critique, and protest. Legitimate action takes place in the political—the political not only claims futurity but also action as its property. To “do something” means that this doing must translate into recognizable political activity; “something” is a stand-in for the word “politics”—one must “do politics” to address any problem. A refusal to “do politics” is equivalent to “doing nothing”—this nothingness is constructed as the antithesis of life, possibility, time, ethics, and morality (a “zero-state” as Julia Kristeva [1982] might call it). Black nihilism rejects this “trick of time” and the lure of emancipatory solutions. To refuse to “do politics” and to reject the fantastical object of politics is the only “hope” for blackness in an antiblack world. Within critical discourses, **black nihilism is saturated with negative semantics**. Theorists consider it the bane of black existence and appropriate language and metaphors of the pathological to situate black nihilism outside of Ethics and moral law. Many describe it as a “disease of the soul” that produces callousness, meaninglessness, and masochism. Thus, the rhetorical maneuvers performed in this work attempt to foreclose a critical engagement with the term itself—to deprive the term of intellectual nourishment and precipitate its demise. I want to rescue the term from this discursive annihilation and offer it up as the most significant philosophical perspective in the twenty-first century. This is certainly an audacious claim, but any critical analysis of black existence in the twenty-first century will have to contend with black nihilism—either reluctantly or otherwise. It is the inescapable interlocutor in every utterance about blackness; it demands an address. One cannot simply disregard the black nihilistic position as insane, naive, or irrational anymore—although these rhetorical maneuvers were successful in previous generations. The surd of anti-blackness requires a position outside the liberal grammar of bio-politics, futurity, and “hope” to limn the depth of black suffering. Black nihilism expresses discursively what black bodies endure existentially in an anti-black world (the “bio-political grotesque”). The project of rescuing (or resuscitating) this term, which is the objective of this essay, is absolutely essential to understanding the “lived experience of the black,” as Fanon would have it. Frederick Nietzsche is credited with the term “Nihilism” and describes it as a particular crisis of modernity. The universal narratives and grounds of legitimation that once secured meaning for the modern world had lost integrity. **In the absence of a metaphysical grounding of social existence, we were left with a void—a void that dispenses with metaphysical substance, even as this substance unsuccessfully attempts to refill this void**. Nihilism, then, presents itself as the philosophical reflection of social decay; it offers politico-philosophical death (the death of ground) as the only “hope” for the world. Theorists often strip black nihilism of this philosophical significance and this, in my view, is a fatal error. When denuded of philosophical functionality, black nihilism becomes nothing more than a catalog of “dysfunctional” behaviors. Behavior and philosophy are unmoored in this understanding of black nihilism, as if one is not the articulation of the other—they, indeed, “inter-articulate” each other. We might even suggest that the purported, dysfunctional behavior of the black nihilist is dis course by other means, when traditional avenues of articulation and redress are inadequate and inaccessible. Cornel West introduces black nihilism as a term to describe a crisis in black communities in Race Matters (1994). For him, nihilism is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine that there are no rational grounds for legitimate standards or authority; it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaningless, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness. The frightening result is a numbing detachment from others and a self-destructive disposition toward the world. Life without meaning, hope, and love breeds a coldhearted, mean-spirited outlook that destroys both the individual and others. (23) It is an existential angst that resembles “a kind of collective clinical depression” and a disease that resembles alcoholism and drug addiction (29). It “can never be completely cured, and there is always the possibility of relapse” (29). According to West, lovelessness, hopelessness, and meaninglessness are results of market forces and market moralities attenuating black institutions, weakening the armor that once provided protection against the pulverizing force of anti-blackness. Black nihilism indexes a devastating exposure to institutional, spiritual, and psychic violence against blacks. Within this description of nihilism, however, there is a certain tension between grounding and ungrounding. Black institutions assert themselves as necessary ground but are unable to secure this position, which leaves a void that capitalistic market forces are filling. This shifting of ground is a symptom of the metaphysical organization of life. The problem, then, is grounding itself. How do black institutions establish themselves as ground and by what process does this ground shift? It is precisely the establishment and shifting of ground that is the “meaninglessness” of which black nihilism rejects—it has no legitimacy other than its “own will to power.” If existential wholeness is predicated on the security of this ground, then black existence itself is always fractured and fragile. The shift of ground from black institutions to market forces indicates that social existence will also shift and bend with the various transitions.We have at the heart of West’s analysis an **“ontology of coherence”** that undermines itself; it assumes a coherent self that never existed but is, instead, the fantasy construction of political hope and its grounding logic. In other words, West can only restore hope and meaning if he re-establishes a grounding for black existence, but as this crisis indicates, any such grounding is subject to shift, transform, or decay.3 **Meaning itself is an aspect of anti-blackness, such that meaning is lost for the black; blacks live in a world of absurdity, and this existential absurdity is meaning for the world.** Meaninglessness is really all there is (or we could say that “real” meaning for the world is utter meaninglessness). In an interview with Mark Sinker, Greg Tate provided a reconceptualization of meaning when he stated, “**the bar between the signifier and the signified could be understood as standing for the Middle passage that separated signification from sign**” (Sinker 1991). **The very structure of meaning in the modern world—signifier, signified, signification, and sign—depends on anti-black violence for its constitution. Not only does the trauma of the Middle passage rupture the signifying process, but it also instantiates a “meaningless” sign as the foundation of language, meaning, and social existence** itself.Following the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok (1986), we could suggest that the meaninglessness of anti-black violence is the “crypt-signifier” that organizes the modern world and its institutions. Any “meaning” that is articulated possesses a kernel of absurdity that blacks embody as “fleshy signs.” The “meaninglessness” that Cornel West bemoans is nothing more than the kernel of nonsense that an anti-black world attempts to conceal with its discourses of hope and futurity. What the black nihilist does is bring this meaninglessness to the fore and disclose it in all of its terroristic historicity.

#### **The 1AC’s contingent relation to the world confuses Afro-pessimism as a meta-theory that precludes imaginative thought beyond nothingness AND is lexically prior to evaluation of aff-solvency.**

**Wilderson 20** Frank B, Prof of African American studies and drama @ UC Irvine [“Afropessimism” LIVERIGHT PUBLISHING CORPORATION A DIVISION OF W. W. NORTON & COMPANY INDEPENDENT PUBLISHERS SINCE 1923]//Mberhe

Black people embody (which is different from saying are always willing or allowed to express) a meta-aporia for political thought and action. For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point FRANK B. WILDERSON III 14 of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). **In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself).** Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism, then, is less of a theory and more of a metatheory:** a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates. Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation** make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the metaaporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.

#### **The alternative is black nihilism - divert spiritual hope away from their desired fantasies to imagine blackness at the end of the world which escapes the prison house of metaphysics – only this relation nothingness retrieves spiritual hope.**

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For the black nihilist, **anti-blackness is metaphysics**. **It is the system of thought and organization of existence that structures the relationship between object/subject, human/animal, rational/irrational, and free/enslaved**—essentially, the categories that constitute the "field of Ontology. Thus, the social rationalization, loss of individuality, economic expansionism, and technocratic domination that both Vattimo and Heidegger analyze actually depend on anti-blackness.5 Metaphysics, then, is unthinkable without antiblackness. Neither Heidegger nor Vattimo explores this aspect of Being’s oblivion—it is the literal destruction of black bodies that provide the psychic, economic, and philosophical resources for modernity to objectify, forget, and ultimately obliterate Being (nonmetaphysical Being). We might then consider black captivity in the modern world as the “perfection” of metaphysics, its shameful triumph, because through the violent technology of slavery Being itself was so thoroughly devastated. Personality became property, as Hortense Spillers would describe it, and with this transubstantiation, Being was objectified, infused with exchange value, and rendered malleable within a sociopolitical order. In short, Being lost its integrity with the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade; at that moment in history, it "finally became possible for an aggressive metaphysics to exercise obscene power—the ability to turn a “human” into a “thing.” The captive is fractured on both the Ontological and ontic levels. This violent transubstantiation leaves little room for the hopeful escape from metaphysics that Heidegger envisions. Can the black-as-object lay claim to DaSein? And if so, how exactly does hermeneutic nihilism restore Being to that which is an object? If we perform a “philosophy of history,” as Vattimo would advise, we understand that metaphysicians, and even those we now consider “postmetaphysicians,” constructed the rational subject against the nonreasoning black, who, according to Hegel, Kant, Hume, and even Nietzsche was situated outside of history, moral law, and consciousness (Bernasconi 2003; Judy 1993; and Mills 1998). It is not enough, then, to suggest that metaphysics engenders forms of violence as a necessity, as a byproduct; thinking itself is structured by anti-blackness from the very start. Any postmetaphysical project that does not take this into account will inevitably reproduce the very structures of thought that it would dismantle. Hermeneutic nihilism provides a discursive frame to understand the intransigence of metaphysics as the residue of anti-blackness in the contemporary moment. The black nihilist, however, must part ways with Vattimo concerning the question of emancipation. For Vattimo, hermeneutic nihilism avoids “passive nihilism.” Passive nihilism is characterized by strands of fatalism or by melancholic nostalgia for lost foundations. To avoid this situation, Vattimo introduces hermeneutics as an alternative to passive nihilism and conceives of hermeneutics as the natural result of an accomplished nihilism—namely, after the weakening of metaphysical Being, hermeneutics replaces metaphysics as a self-consuming “foundation.” He attempts to move beyond the metaphysical remnants found in the theories of Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Wittgenstein and think of hermeneutics as competing interpretations that reduce the violence of secure foundations. This of course provides the possibility for a radical democracy and a reconfiguration of Ethics, Law, and the Political. Ultimately, this weakening of metaphysical Being allows the human to project him-/ herself in the world, what Vattimo calls “projectionality,” and engage in the unique project that constitutes existence. This is the crux of emancipation for Vattimo. We, ironically, "find ourselves back in the province of “progress,” “hope,” “betterment,” all the metaphysical instruments that constrain the very life that he would emancipate. This, of course, is unavoidable, for he can only twist these concepts and reclaim them as part of a postmetaphysical agenda. Vattimo’s hermeneutic nihilism is not very much different than political theology and democratic liberalism. It is a discourse of hope, a politics of hope that advances the belief that we can weaken metaphysics and reduce suffering, violence, and pain. When it comes to black suffering, however, we are compelled to hold up the mirror of historicity and inquire about the possibilities of emancipation for the black-as-object. Anti-blackness is the residue that remains, the intransigent substance that makes it impossible to destroy metaphysics completely. The black nihilist must confront this residue, but with the understanding that the eradication of this residue would truly end the world itself. Black emancipation is world destructive; it is not an aperture or an opening for future possibilities and political reconfigurations (Wilderson 2010). The “end of the world” that Vattimo envisions does not take into account that **pulverized black bodies sustain the world—its institutions, economic systems, environment, theologies, philosophies, and so forth.** **Because anti-blackness infuses itself into every fabric of social existence, it is impossible to emancipate blacks without literally destroying the world.** Moreover, this means that black emancipation will not yield a new world or possibilities for reorganization—black emancipation is the nihilistic “solution” that would destroy the field of all possible solutions. In this sense, black emancipation becomes something like death for the world—with all its Heideggerian valences. Black bodies and black suffering, then, pose a problem for emancipatory logic. If literal black bodies sustain modernity and metaphysics—through various forms of captivity, terror, and subjection—then what would emancipation entail for blacks? How do we allow metaphysics to self-consume and weaken when blackness nourishes metaphysics? (We can define the “problem” in W. E. B. Dubois’s poignant question “what does it mean to be a problem?” in the twentieth century as metaphysics itself [1903, 10]. Now we must ask: “what does it mean to be the source of metaphysics’ sustenance in the 21st century?”) Either the world would have to eliminate black bodies, which would amount to a self-destructive solution for all, or it would have to wrest blackness from the clutches of metaphysical anti-blackness that sustains the world. Our hope is that black emancipation would be accomplished through the latter, but history does not prove that this is possible—every emancipatory strategy that attempted to rescue blackness from antiblackness inevitably reconstituted and reconfigured the anti-blackness it tried to eliminate. Anti-blackness is labile. It adapts to change and endlessly refashions itself; this makes emancipation an impossible feat. Because we are still attempting to mine the depths of anti-blackness in the twenty-first century and still contemplating the contours of this juggernaut, anti-blackness will escape every emancipatory attempt to capture it. We are left, yet again, to place our hope in a future politics that avoids history, historicity, and the immediacy of black suffering. For this reason, the black nihilist rejects the emancipatory impulse within certain aspects of black critical discourse and cultural/critical theory. In this sense, the modifier “black” in the term “black nihilism” indicates much more than an “identity”; a blackened nihilism pushes hermeneutic nihilism beyond the limits of its metaphysical thinking by foregrounding the function of anti-blackness in structuring thought. Black nihilism acknowledges that metaphysics is a destructive matrix, but it resists the temptation to believe that there is an alternative or a “beyond” the violence that sustains the world. For many, this could be read as fatalism or passive nihilism. The terms “passive” and “fatalism” applied to black nihilism are saturated with negativity to discredit its legitimacy; this discursive maneuver becomes another metaphysical strategy of disciplining and punishing “errant” thought. Despite these invectives and political hope’s “will to power,” black nihilism uses hermeneutics to return the political “dream” to its proper place—in the place of the void (Fanon). Black nihilism demands a traversal, but not the traversal that reintegrates “the subject” (and Being) back into society by shattering fundamental fantasies of metaphysics, but a traversal that ~~disables~~ and **invalidates every imaginative and symbolic function**. Its hermeneutics “blackens” the world, as Lewis Gordon suggests in “Theory in Black: Teleological Suspensions in Philosophy of Culture” (2010). The problem that confronts the black nihilist is one of epistemology, especially when the dominant epistemology privileges metaphysical forms of antiblack organizations of knowledge. The "field of knowledge is uneven and reflects the asymmetrical power relations that sustain anti-black violence in modernity. The difficulty in expressing black nihilistic thought is that it is situated in the tense space between hermeneutics and epistemology. If we think of epistemology as an anti-black formation, then every appeal to it will reproduce the very metaphysical violence that is the source of black suffering. Nihilistic Hermeneutics allows us to fracture epistemology, to chip away at its metaphysical science, and to enunciate from within this fissure. Vattimo provides a cogent explanation of the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics in his reading of Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Re!ection (1981): Epistemology is founded on the presumption that all discourses are commensurate with and translatable among each other, and that the foundation of their truth consists precisely in this translation into a basic language, that is, the one which mirrors facts themselves. Hermeneutics instead admits that there is no such single unifying language, and tries to appropriate the language of the other rather than translate into its own tongue... Epistemology is the discourse of normal science, while hermeneutics is discourse about as-yetincommensurable discourses. (Vattimo 1988, 149) Read through the register of anti-blackness, we can understand epistemology as the violent attempt at discursive and linguistic unification—the compulsion to establish a unifying ground of language. Because blackness is placed outside of the “customary lexis of life and culture,” as Hortense Spillers (2003) reminds us, blackness speaks an inassimilable language, an “anti-grammar” that resists linguistic/epistemological domination—what we call “translation” (221). Anti-black epistemology is somewhat schizophrenic in its aim: it at once posits blackness as an anti-grammatical entity—paradoxically, a nonfoundation-foundation that provides the condition of possibility for its own existence—and at the same time, and in stunning contradiction, it forces a translation of this anti-grammar into a system of understanding that is designed to exclude it. This tension between grammatical exclusion and compulsory inclusion is part of the violence of captivity. A hermeneutical practice that acknowledges the impossible translation of blackness without forcing its annihilation (through translation/domination) is the only way we can understand the nihilist. Put another way, black nihilism shatters the coherence of anti-black epistemology and cannot be “known,” or rendered legible, through traditional epistemology. The problem that we encounter is that black nihilism is reduced to an anti-black epistemology—the “illegible grammar” that speaks through the black body, psyche, and “spirit” is forcibly, and erroneously, translated into an epistemology that is inimical to its meaning. Black nihilism cannot be reduced to an anti-black foundation of knowledge (or metaphysics), and when this translation, this compulsory alignment of knowledge, fails to explain or understand the black nihilist, black nihilism is considered pathological and must be disciplined, contained, and, ultimately, destroyed. If all knowledge must submit to a bio-political imperative, then the socially dead object is always already situated at an impasse in relation to this imperative: either one lives in bad faith—the “optimistic” and politically hopeful belief that anti-black structures can be transformed to provide vitality to blackness, despite all evidence to the contrary—or one lives as the pathogen (i.e., socially pathological) and risks increased vulnerability to violent state apparatuses. In other words, the “pathological behavior” that West and Brogdon bemoan as self-destructive, pessimistic, and apathetic from black youth is a gross misreading. Perhaps this “pathology” is a way of speaking otherwise when other forms of discourse are inaccessible; the nihilist might have to assume an anti-grammatical enunciation to express the inexpressible. West and Brogdon subject this antigrammar to an anti-black epistemology, which mandates that all action must align with its bio-political imperative. When this forced translation fails, the nihilist is labeled “pathological,” “troubled,” “faithless,” “suicidal,” “fatalistic,” and “reckless.” Hermeneutical nihilism challenges this domination and allows incommensurate grammars to exist. The strategy of forced alignment— translation as domination—is a tool of the Political designed to preserve its metaphysical organization. Bio-politics will always fail the politically dead object because bio-politics depends on the politically dead black object to constitute itself. If political integration is the dream of the optimists, it will result in nothing more than what Achille Mbembe (2003) calls the “necropolitical” (40). In this context, we can define necro-politics as the distribution of fraudulent hope that leaves the subject endangered. Throughout this essay, I have argued that the Politics of hope preserve metaphysical structures that sustain black suffering. **This preservation amounts to an exploitation of hope**—when the Political colonizes the spiritual principle of organization of existence. The Politics of hope, then, is bound up with metaphysical violence, and this violence masquerades as a “solution” to the problem of anti-blackness. Temporal linearity, perfection, betterment, struggle, work, and utopian futurity are conceptual instruments of the Political that will never obviate black suffering or anti-black violence; these concepts only serve to reproduce the conditions that render existence unbearable for blacks. Political theologians and black optimists avoid the immediacy of black suffering, the horror of anti-black pulverization, and place relief in a “not-yet-but-is (maybe)-to-come-social order” that, itself, can do little more but admonish blacks to survive to keep struggling. Political hope becomes a vicious and abusive cycle of struggle—it mirrors the Lacanian drive, and we encircle an object (black freedom, justice, relief, redress, equality, etc.) that is inaccessible because it doesn’t really exist. The political theologian and black optimist, then, propose a collective Jouissance as an answer to black suffering—"finding the joy in struggle, the victory in toil, and the satisfaction in inefficacious action. We continue to “struggle” and “work” as black youth are slaughtered daily, black bodies are incarcerated as forms of capital, black infant mortality rates are soaring, and hunger is disabling the bodies, minds, and spirits of desperate black youth. In short, these conditions are deep metaphysical problems—the sadistic pleasure of metaphysical domination— and “work” and “struggle” avoid the terrifying fact that the world depends on black death to sustain itself. Black nihilism attempts to break this “drive”—to stop it in its tracks, as it were—and to end the cycle of insanity that political hope perpetuates. The question that remains is a question often put to the black nihilist: what is the point? This compulsory geometrical structuring of thought—all knowledge must submit to, and is reducible to, a point—it is an epistemic #icker of certainty, determination, and, to put it bluntly, life. “The point” exists for life; it enlivens, enables, and sustains knowledge. Thought outside of this mandatory point is illegible and useless. To write outside of the “episteme of life” and its grammar will require a position outside of this point, a position somewhere in the infinite horizon of thought (perhaps this is what Heidegger wanted to do with his reconfiguration of thought). Writing in this way is inherently subversive and refuses the geometry of thought. Nevertheless, the nihilist is forced to enunciate his refusal through a “point,” a point that is contradictory and paradoxical all at once. To say that the point of this essay is that “the point” is fraudulent—its promise of clarity and life are inadequate— will not satisfy the hunger of disciplining the nihilist and insisting that one undermine the very ground upon which one stands. Black nihilistic hermeneutics resists “the point” but is subjected to it to have one’s voice heard within the marketplace of ideas. The “point” of this essay is that political hope is pointless. Black suffering is an essential part of the world, and placing hope in the very structure that sustains metaphysical violence, the Political, will never resolve anything. This is why the black nihilist speaks of “exploited hope,” and the black nihilist attempts to wrest hope from the clutches of the Political. Can we think of hope outside the Political? Must “salvation” translate into a political grammar or a political program? The nihilist, then, hopes for the end of political hope and its metaphysical violence. **Nihilism is not antithetical to hope; it does not extinguish hope but reconfigures it. Hope is the foundation of the black nihilistic hermeneutic.** In “Blackness and Nothingness,” Fred Moten (2013) conceptualizes blackness as a “pathogen” to metaphysics, something that has the ability to unravel, to disable, and to destroy anti-blackness. If we read Vattimo through Moten’s brilliant analysis, we can suggest that blackness is the limit that Heidegger and Nietzsche were really after. **It is a “blackened” world that will ultimately end metaphysics, but putting an end to metaphysics will also put an end to the world itself—this is the nihilism that the black nihilist must theorize through.** This is a far cry from what we call “anarchy,” however. The black nihilist has as little faith in the metaphysical reorganization of society through anarchy than he does in traditional forms of political existence. The black nihilist offers political apostasy as the spiritual practice of denouncing metaphysical violence, black suffering, and the idol of antiblackness. The act of renouncing will not change political structures or offer a political program; instead, it is the act of retrieving the spiritual concept of hope from the captivity of the Political. Ultimately, it is impossible to end metaphysics without ending blackness, and the black nihilist will never be able to withdraw from the Political completely without a certain death-drive or being-toward-death. This is the essence of black suffering: the lack of reprieve from metaphysics, the tormenting complicity in the reproduction of violence, and the lack of a coherent grammar to articulate these dilemmas.

## 

## **Blaqillegalism K**

**The condition of possibility for modern antitrust law is the slave existing as property. The use of law to reform this system relies on this condition of possibility and reproduces the same logics of anti-Blackness that was used to**

**Warren, ‘18**

(Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror,Duke University Press, “Chapter 2: Outlawing” pp. 62-109)

Although Tuitt’s analysis presents a humanist desire to reclaim the slave as a human agent, despite the fact **the law considers the slave property** alongside inanimate and animate objects, rendering it a subject/object (which I believe is a strategy that only yields contradiction and aporias), her claim that the presence of the slave engenders law provides insight into the relation between law and ontology. **Contract law** (law of chattel) is perhaps **the hallmark of modern legal development**, **given the need to regulate commerce and specify the rights and entitlement of property holders.** But this corpus of law **emerges** because one needs **to integrate the slave into the world.** In other words, **contract law** conceals an ontological project: it **uses the discourse of property, chattel, rights, and trade to divide the world into human** subjects [Dasein], those who are entitled to the protection and enforcement of their ontological (non)relation, **and** the world of **things**, those entities **lacking** such **protection** of any relation, **but whose existence is necessary for the human** to operate within the world. The law of chattel performs the work of dividing legal seeing from not seeing. **Thus, the law** of chattel, through the contract form, **is predicated upon an ontological difference** that it disavows (or more precisely forgets): the difference between Being (the self that is the locus of rights and entitlement, as a stand-in for the ontological [non]relation) and being (the world of objects that support this self). To read Oren Ben-Dor’s postmetaphysical meditation on law through (and against) Patricia Tuitt’s theoretical analysis of contract law, we can suggest that **the** primary **function of chattel law is to protect and enforce** the ground of the **(non)relation**—**this law is ethical to the extent that the rights bestowed to the property holder enable him to project himself into the world of things and to re-member Being.** The destruction of the flesh, the **onticide that renders the slave available equipment, is a legal necessity**, since **contract law depends on it**—the slave is produced through this very violence. Ben-Dor’s suggestion that “**the** essence of law is not legal” provides a hermeneutic for reading and interpreting **law, as always already an ontological enterprise**. Taking chattel law, for example, **the essence of this law is not** the **regulation of commerce** and property rights, **but the** ontological **division the law engenders between** the world of **things** (equipment) **and** the world of the **subject** (the being for which Being is an issue for it—and thus requires rights to discover this issue). Moreover, **this legal division is predicated upon** both Nancy’s “seeing the invisible” and **outlawing black being**. Ethics and freedom are the ontological discourses of law. They perform the crucial work of dividing the world between the free (the human) and unfree (the equipment of the human) and between humans and available equipment. Again, we lose any hint or suggestion of ethics between the human and his equipment (the not there), as Spillers suggests. **The law** of chattel **relies on this** loss of the ethical relation **as a condition of its possibility**—**if the slave** (as chattel) **were to arrive in** the withdrawn place of **Being** and have that inhabitation protected and enforced, **the entire edifice of chattel law** (**a** particular **feature of modern contract law**) **would crumble.** Critical legal theorist Patricia Williams argues that contract law “reduces life to fairy tale.”12 This is the case, since the contract forges a fantasy (a scenario of relations conceived in the actors’ minds)—it transforms imagination into legal obligation. But the **contract creates** not only **the structure of relation** between actors, **but also the object through which the relation is sustained**. In this case, **the black object is constructed**, or invented, **within the vacuum** (or hole) **this structure produces**. Bryan Wagner might describe this vacuum in the contract as **blackness exist**ing **“in exchange without being party to exchange**.”13 The object is exchanged between subjects, but the object itself is not a subject, not a party, within the contract. It exists merely within the black hole of the contract, as that which allows the structure to exist without a subjective existence itself. To exist in exchange is to lack existence outside transaction; **existence for black being is ephemeral and tethered to** the flimsy temporality of the **contract structure**. We might suggest, after Charles Mills, that **an antiblack contract** (a racial contract) **is an instrument for dividing the world** between acting subjects and inactive objects existing only in exchange.14 Thus, **the contract performs important ontological work,** and, for this reason, **it has become central to legal metaphysics.** Frank Wilderson suggests, “African slavery did not present an ethical dilemma for global civil society. The ethical dilemmas were unthought.”15 The dilemmas are unthought because applying the ethical relation to a being that never arrives and is not seen presents a stupefying conundrum that ethics is unable to resolve. We lack an ontological procedure or grammar to situate the outlawed in relation to ethics. Our ethics are entangled in our ontological commitments. For this reason, black being is unable to appeal even to Levinasian ethics—although he desires to escape the violence of ontology (one might argue this escape is predicated on a misreading of Heidegger, which would mean Levinas leads us right back to Heideggerian ontology). For as Fanon rightly critiques Sartre—which I would argue also applies to Levinas—“The white man is not only The Other but also the master, whether real or imaginary.”16 In other words, **the Other is always already constituted by outlawing—the Law of AntiBlackness.** There isn’t a place in the work of either Heidegger (and neo-Heideggerians) or Levinas that is free from antiblackness. Such a place is a ruse. In his critique of ontology, Fanon argues that “not only must the black man be black; he must be black in relation to the white man. Some critics will take it upon themselves to remind us that the proposition has a converse. I say this is false. The black man lacks ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man.”17 The phrase in relation opens us onto the impossibility of ethics, since ethics would require the very converse of the proposition that Fanon refuses. The black must be for the white man, as equipment in human form—the ontic illusion of humanity. But this being is not the being that grounds ethics or ontology; it is an existence untranslatable into the language of being and ethics (which is why “ontology does not permit an understanding of the black man”).18 This is why black being is an “impurity, a flaw that outlaws any ontological explanation,” as Fanon would argue.19The procedure of outlawing rests on the severing of both the ethical relation and the ontological relation. This also returns us to the function of law. If, as Oren Ben-Dor avers, Outlawing 75 “To let Dasein gain ground, to let Dasein ground as one with the simple unity of the fourfold, is to be ethical. To let Dasein be open towards its unfolding world as the grounding of its nearest is ethical. To protect and enforce such ground is the essence of law.”20 Then outlawing is a departure from this function. Rather than protecting and enforcing an ontological ground (the ethical demand of Being), **outlawing functions to render black being continuously vulnerable**, accessible, and uncovered. It **employs judicial procedures, discourses, and technologies to sustain this** vulnerability—as **it is the precondition for the Law** of Being.

**The slave is property and the function of law is to maintain this relational dynamic. Within the aff the slave then becomes a means to an end exploits the lack of ontological resistance that Black people have. This should be independently rejected**

**Warren, ‘18**

(Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror,Duke University Press, “Chapter 2: Outlawing” pp. 62-109)

**The law**, rather than serving as an aperture for this movement, **becomes** a terrifying stasis—or **a reverse zero degree**. This dreaded geometrical figuration, this point, constitutes the **irresolvable within the system of legal thinking and reasoning**. This point of saturation cannot be reduced to mere ontic distortion, since this point is the absence of ontological difference—but an absence that enables the subject before the law to have movement, to bring forth grievance, to seek redress, and to maintain dignity. We might also consider this point of saturation the distortion of distortion. In other words, the ontic/legal distortion that perpetuates the forgetting of Being is predicated on another distortion, or a disavowed concealing. Law must conceptualize and outlaw this distortion of distortion (the concealment that makes legal concealment possible). Ronald Judy might also call this distortion an “interdiction,” in which “a censorship to be inarticulate, to not compel, to have no capacity to move, to be without effect, without agency, without thought.”24 The distortion, then, serves as an interdiction (or a censorship, a ban) on movement—the movement of thought, communication, and legal agency. **Legal reasoning must conceal this** distortion, since **the distortion throws law into crisis** and produces contractions, paradoxes, and absurdities (like the Lacanian real rupturing the legal symbolic). For **antebellum law**, the free black incarnates this distortion because this figure **foregrounds the problem with Being and law**—the severing between blackness, ethics, and ontology—**which the law would want to** forget or **to resolve through property rights**. Can black being hold property in itself? Can black being constitute a being for itself and not for another? Should black being become an end in and of itself? The free black complicates these questions differently than it does for the slave, I would argue. The law uses property rights to resolve or answer these questions. Property is property, even if this property takes on a human form. **The slave is** indeed **property**, and the laws of property and propriety are in full effect. Despite the debates concerning the immorality of slavery, **the rights of the property holder trump any appeal** to the dignity or natural right **one would assert on behalf of the slave**. Put differently, **the law’s function is to protect the** dignity and ontological relation **of the human** to Being, and property/equipment is necessary to fulfill this function—even in distorted form. This is why 78 Chapter two the law can appeal to rights to resolve the dilemma of the slave. It is only the rights of the human, of the property holder, that really matter before the law. **The slave becomes a means to that end.**

#### **The use of Law cannot restore Black being and every act through the US court of law legitimizes the law as a guardian of being and the ontological terror that results from it**

**Warren, ‘18**

(Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Chapter 2: Outlawing,” pp. 89-91\*, ZW)

\* pagination from electronic copy of the book

Emancipation is precisely this “cruel mockery.” The term free black explodes into onomastic absurdity and existential cruelty. This presents an ontic distortion, which conceals the ontological terror undergirding this term. Emancipation, then, is deceptive in that freedom is considered the outcome of this process; but this is not the case. Emancipation and freedom are antithetical, and the tendency in critical discourse and historiography to conflate the terms is problematic. The free black, as paradigm, necessitates an unraveling of these terms, since the ontological presumptions and objectives are exposed in their terror. It is precisely this conflation that frustrates the author of the epigraph, and he insists that a free black is an oxymoron. Indeed, what type of freedom could blacks have in an antiblack order, especially when this freedom leaves blacks even worse off than slaves? Not only does this freedom amount to a pernicious form of bondage, but it also leaves these black ~~beings~~ without a proper ontological place, as “they are not looked upon as men, in the true and proper sense of the term.” Emancipation is an instrument of law, an ontic strategy of distortion. Rather than restoring black ~~being~~, reuniting the body and the flesh, emancipation solidifies this fissure. **Law**, then, **lacks a strategy**, or tactic, **to restore blackness**, to transform available equipment into human being. In an antiblack order such a restorative enterprise is destructive—since the black object, as nothing, must be continuously obliterated. The free black constitutes an ontological catachresis in that it lacks any proper referent to capture the ~~being~~ without place in the world. The true purpose of emancipation, then, is to entrap black ~~being~~ in an abyss of shattered signification, terroristic operations, and irreparable violation. The ontological transformation that emancipation promises is deceptive; **rather than transforming property** (~~being~~ for another) **into human** (being for itself), **it suspends becoming. This is the operation of ontological terror**. Within romantic, humanist narratives (both historiographical and philosophical), emancipation is presented as a legal process that restores what was taken from the human. The human is presumed as the ontological starting point, and emancipation, then, is merely a change in status, not a change in ontology. But as Taney’s decision illustrates, the human cannot be assumed as the ground for emancipation when it concerns blacks. **Articles of merchandise are not human, and the transformation cannot be restorative.** This is precisely why the author of the epigraph mocks the very idea of emancipation. Those released from physical bondage are “not looked upon as men, in the true and proper sense of the term.” Biological resemblance does not guarantee humanity —equipment in human form. The human, as I have argued, is an ontological relation and not a mere legal designation. **The law is unable to transform what ontology will not allow.** Perhaps, in the final analysis, this was Taney’s frustration. **The law will fail** as an instrument of humanism **for blacks**. To suggest that blacks are not human, however, is not to suggest that blacks do not have an existence, but we lack a grammar to describe whatever this existence entails. This is the misery of bearing the burden of nothing in an antiblack world. In her groundbreaking Scenes of Subjection, Saidiya Hartman describes postbellum emancipation as “travestied” precisely because the promises of liberal individualism were not realized. I would argue that emancipation, regardless of metaphysical time schemes and historical temporalities, succeeds in this very travesty. In other words, emancipation never intended to fulfill the promises of individual liberalism; in fact, it could not. It was unable to transform the nothing of metaphysics into a form of humanist value. **Individual liberalism becomes a practice of fantasy and imagination** when blacks become its object. The fantasy of equality and the humanist imagination can dream about a world of freedom, justice, and equality, but it must continually disavow the nightmare of the metaphysical holocaust, which continues. Whether we are in the antebellum period, the post-Reconstruction period, or the post – Civil Rights period, the metaphysical holocaust that obliterates black ~~being~~ and sustains ontological terror is unchanging. This, indeed, is a belief that progress is a myth, even if the calendar year changes. Emancipation is entangled in the myth of progress, temporal change, and freedom dreams. Since the human and his freedom are foreclosed as options, blacks are thrown into the terroristic space of ontological terror. Emancipation is the legal technology of ontological terror; it is the distortion of distortion. **Ontological terror constitutes the strategies, tactics, and technologies that sustain the fissure between the flesh and the body** (the primary relation), the enforced not seeing of black ~~being~~, and the obliteration of black bodies and cosmologies. It is precisely the space without place that is created for ~~beings~~ when the law rebounds upon itself. Put differently, ontological terror is the solution to Taney’s conundrum: how do you honor the property rights of the human (to discard black property) and, at the same time, protect the political community [Mitsein] from the black nothing, which would undermine it? Ontological terror resolves the tension to the extent that blacks are not “looked upon as men in the true and proper sense.” The lack of propriety in a political community is the terror that black ~~being~~ endures once emancipated. **The political community offers protection for the ontological relation, even in distorted form, but without a political community blacks are left exposed**, without any ontological security. Thus, **a vicious choice is presented between continued captivity** as “article of merchandise” **or ontological insecurity** and terroristic emancipation. **This is the crux of black suffering**, and now the line between these choices has blurred to a point of indistinction (or a “zone of indistinction,” as Agamben might call it).

#### **The law cannot address the injuries of black people it only recognizes us in it’s destruction.**

**Anarkata**: A Statement Oct. 12, 20**19** <https://afanarchists.wordpress.com/2019/10/12/anarkata-a-statement/>

**Anarkata praxis affirms the use of extralegal activity** as a means **to achieve Black liberation**. Because **law depends on and codifies the anti-Black functions of property acquisition, Black criminality, and white terror**, Anarkata sees all significant revolutionary struggles for Black liberation as inherently criminalized by the State. Where the law functions to adjudicate matters concerning human subjects, we realize that **Blackness is always criminalized** under the state precisely because **we are marked as inhuman and our bodies are** always already **outside of the law** regardless of **whether we are being lawful or not**. To be Black is to have one’s very being, (one’s joys, hopes, peace, survival) outlawed by the state. **This outlawed status** not only provided the legal grounding for slavery, but **is the legal impetus behind** our bodies **being targeted** for continued mass incarceration, harassment by law enforcement and white citizens. It is the reason why the cops are so readily called on Black people by white citizens, when no real reason exists. In being the legal exclusion that is rendered lawless under white supremacy, **we cannot** ever **depend on the law to address our own injuries** done to us, and this is why **the law is unavailable to us** as a means **to obtain justice** or achieve **freedom**. In the words of Calvin Warren **the law “recognizes the black only in its destruction**, **and** this destruction **is required for legal intelligibility**. Thus, something like **black redress is outside of the law’s jurisdiction** to the extent that the aim of redress is restorative, and **restoring black being** is not only impossible, but **antithetical to the law’s aim**.” We understand **the white court of law** as **an illegitimate colonizing institution and reject it as having legitimate jurisdiction over Black bodies**. The fugitive nature of Blackness, **the inherent outlawing of our bodies** by the state and our positionality as being already outside of the law, **gives rise to a Black illegalism** where **extralegal activities to further our survival** are foregrounded. For Anarkatas, illegalism does not support all Black criminal activity; only the kind that pushes forward revolutionary struggle and promotes the continued survival of our communities.

**[Idk if i should keep this card or not] Discourse on reforming the capitalist system cannot account for the slave which exist outside of white civil society and makes possible the captitalist/worker relationship so any affects of the aff excludes niggas and should be rejected**

**Aarons, 16** [K. Aarons, “No Selves To Abolish: Afropessimism, Anti-Politics and the End of the World,” 2016, The Anarchist Library]//Townes

From a practical or historical point of view, **the afropessimist story reaches back** to Assata Shakur, to the Black Liberation Army, even all the way back to the great Nat Turner, the Dismal Swamp, the Seminole Wars, and so on. But as an explicit body of theoretical work, it begins really with Historian Orlando Patterson (despite his own liberal proclivities). Patterson argued in the early 1980’s that, contrary to Marxist assumptions, what historically defines the slave’s position in society is ultimately not the phenomenon of forced labour. Although frequent, forced labour occurs only contingently or incidentally, and not everywhere slaves are found. The slave relation, Patterson argued, is rather defined by a threefold condition: a) general dishonourment (or social death), b) natal alienation (i.e. the systematic rupture of familial and genealogical continuities), c) gratuitous or limitless violence. This threefold combination gives rise to a being experientially and socially devoid of relationality: the slave relation is a type of social relation whose product is a relationless object.3 In the late 1990s Saidiya Hartman, following on the work of cultural theorist Hortense Spillers, added to Patterson’s criteria an ontological dimension: the slave, she argues, is one who finds 3 Patterson, Orlando, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Harvard, 1982), 1-17. 4 themselves positioned in their very existence, their being-as-such, as a non-human – a captured, owned, and traded object for another. The ontological abjection of slave existence is not primarily defined by alienation and exploitation (a suffering due to the perceived loss of one’s humanity) but by accumulation and fungibility: the condition of being owned and traded, of having one’s being reduced to a being-for-the-captor. 4 Far from disappearing with the 13th amendment, or even in the post-civil rights period, afropessimists argue that the formal traits of the slave relation were reproduced and kept alive through the perpetuation of a form of social and civil death that continues to materially and symbolically locate the Black body ‘outside Humanity’. **At a symbolic level, these theorists argue that the racial abjection of the slave was transferred to an ‘epidermalised’ racial construction of Blackness, which had the effect of inscribing the social death and relationless objecthood at the level of appearance itself**: the slave relation now marks itself within the being-as-such of Blackness. **Blacks today continue to be constitutively denied symbolic membership within White civil society** (both culturally and politically), in such a way that no analogical bridge to White culture exists through which Blacks could conceivably wage a ‘war of position’ or sue for the sort of junior partner status otherwise accorded to White women, non-Black people of colour, or ‘dutiful’ immigrants. The symbolic death or exclusion of Blackness from Humanism means that it is not ‘Whiteness’ or White supremacy, but ‘Humanity’ as an ontologically anti-Black structure as such, which stands in antagonism with Black bodies, since Humanity’s self-understanding of its own subjecthood as value is coherent only so long as it is measured against the killable and warehousable objecthood of Black flesh. At a corporeal level, the subjection of the Black body to direct relations of force has been institutionally carried forward through institutional paradigms of convict leasing, police impunity and mass incarceration. Throughout, Black bodies continue to be marked by a constitutive rather than contingent experience of direct material violence. Prior to any transgression, **the Black body is subsumed by relations** of direct force **that do not possess the same sort of logical or instrumental coherence** characterising the exploitation **of wage labourers by capital**, for example. The physical violence marking Black bodies is continuous with the slave relation, in that it remains basically despotic and gratuitous, awaiting no legitimate cause or justification, open to limitless expression, and enjoying institutional impunity. Modernity is therefore fundamentally organised around a ‘double register’.5 On the one hand, those included within civil society are subjected to a ‘contingent, ideological exploitation by variable capital’ (a regime of hegemony or exploitation). Yet **this hegemonic exploitation nonetheless tends to preserve** for **the non-Black worker** an existential commons that places symbolic limits on their degradation. For example, even where they may be criminalised, as in the ‘bloody legislation against vagabondage’ described by Marx in the first volume of Capital, still a transgression is always logically necessary for this criminalisation to take place, and hence the violence never seeps 4 Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, (Oxford, 1997), 7, 21, 26: ‘[T]he value of blackness resided in its metaphorical aptitude, whether literally understood as the fungibility of the commodity or understood as the imaginative surface upon which the master and the nation came to understand themselves. […] [T]he fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.’ 5 Steve Martinot & Jared Sexton, ‘The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy’, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 9:2. 5 into the being of the criminal per se, i.e. it never becomes ontological. In this way, a symbolic space of belonging is safeguarded within White civil society through the social reinforcement of a racialised pathos of distance, whose axiomatic was distilled by Fanon into a simple phrase: ‘simple enough one has only not to be a n[epithet]’. This horizon below which non-Blacks cannot sink without scandal is marked off by despotic direct force relations, which function as the existential border separating those who live in a de jure perpetual vulnerability to terroristic violence, and those for whom such violence could only be experienced under a de facto state of exception or subsequent to a transgression. These two distinct modalities of power do not simply emerge at the same time; rather, one conditions the other. What Martinot and Sexton describe as the ‘ignorability’ of Black death and the impunity of police murder of Black bodies provides the constitutive background for the symbolic rationality of White democracy, and the symbolic currency of social capital within it. The incoherence of Black death is the condition for the coherence of White common sense and hegemonic discourse. For this reason, **the entire liberal discourse** of ‘ethics’ – inasmuch as it takes place within the White discourses framed by the ‘ignorability’ of police and carceral terror – **renders** it totally **irrelevant to Black existence**.6 What Wilderson calls the ‘crisis of the existential commons’ therefore describes the constitutive gulf across which any attempt to analogise and tether White visions of emancipation to Black life are bound to stumble. The product of asymmetrical regimes of force, it renders the project of what we could call an ‘affirmative identity politics’ untenable for Black flesh. It is on the basis of this orienting problematic of social death that afropessimists attempt to demonstrate the one-sided, regional, and limited character of Marxist, anarchist, feminist, and post-colonial visions of emancipation. Each of these traditions remains external to the paradigm of Blackness because of the way in which their grammar of suffering frames the subject of revolutionary practice – the working class, the subaltern, non-Black women – on the basis of ‘mediating objects’ that allow it to analogise itself with White civil society, and which in each case are absent and unavailable to those positioned by social death. Such mediating objects can include ‘land, labour-power, and cultural artefacts (such as language and customs)’. As Wilderson writes, **‘social death is a condition, void**, not of land, but **of a capacity to secure relational status** through transindividual objects – be those objects elaborated by land, labour, or love’.7 Since the ability to analogise or humanise oneself is the condition of a struggle in which the social coordinates of identity can serve as an orienting axis for struggle – i.e. it is the condition of any positive identity politics, wherein one seeks to valorise and augment the social standing or symbolic caché of one’s group either by recognition from the State, or by constituting a community bound together by common values, cultural and familial ties, etc. – those who struggle against oppression therefore need to consider the difference between those groups accorded a sufficient quanta of social capital to become ‘junior partners’ of White civil society and **Black subjects who remain shut out of this economy** of symbolic recognition

### **Blaqillegalism K:**

### **ALT: Thus Black People in the U.S. refuse the legitimacy of the White Court of Law and instead engage in BlaqIllegalist praxis and Fugitivity to break up monopolistic corporations that are parasitic to the Black community (still working on phrasing this)**

#### **Blaqillegalist praxis includes any act that targets white institutions and business that have looted our communities and is a net better way to improve the material conditions of black folk than going through the state**

Dubian **Ade** Feb. 12, **2020**, <https://hoodcommunist.org/2020/02/13/black-is-crime-notes-on-blaqillegalism/>

Here **we** will examine and **reclaim** the **Black illegal forms that** would **fall under** a **Blaqillegalist praxis**. Disorderly Conduct Definitions for what actually constitutes disorderly conduct remain arbitrary, and on the ground, **disorderly conduct** could **refer to any normal activity Black people do that break some arbitrary law** imposed by the state. This could be anything from “being too loud” in a public place, playing loud music, selling goods without a permit, soliciting, loitering, trespassing, squatting, protesting without a permit, to even resisting arrest. **These laws are** almost always **meant to target Black people** specifically **and** are **a residue of** the **slave codes** that regulated Black movement and assembly in public spaces. Black people always break these laws, usually unbeknownst to them, because **what is being regulated** here **is Black everyday life**. Blaqillegalist praxis asserts that **we should break** as many of **these** arbitrary **laws** as possible **while evading the police**. Theft Under white supremacist capitalism, **all theft by Black people** **that targets white individuals, institutions, and businesses are reparations**. This includes shoplifting, petty theft, burglary, looting, expropriation, grand larceny, scamming, embezzlement, piracy, and fraud. Colloquially called swiping in the Black community, these acts have always been practiced and for some have been a viable means of survival. **Black theft emerges as** a direct refusal of capitalist oppression and **resistance against a system that has stolen from Black people for centuries.** A **Blaqillegalist praxis** would **encourage continued decentralized theft of white institutions** as the best means **to obtain** reparations for slavery and colonialism. Furthermore, the stealing and redistribution of **food, medication, toiletries, clothing and other necessities** serve the collective survival of Black communities. As long as the targets of such activities are white, this is Blaqillegalist praxis. Sex Work Sex work continues to be criminalized in general which pushes many people especially Black sex workers into dangerous situations with both police and clients. Many Black femmes, especially Black trans femmes involved in sex work do so for survival. When anti-prostitution laws are enforced, they are more aggressively targeted at Black sex workers. Although the criminalization of sex work is not ideal, Black sex workers have and will continue to break the law regardless. Black sex work defies the jurisdiction of the state and refuses to be subsumed by the law. On the ground, money generated from sex work is often shared by a community of sex workers to ensure the collective survival and well-being of that community. When police officers refuse to protect sex workers from violence, this fugitive community is often the first line of defense in keeping sex workers safe. Sex work is a fugitive act for Black people and is a reclamation of bodily autonomy in a world where Black people’s bodies are rendered as property not belonging to them. It is an act of flight from the bodily directives that are the secretion of patriarchy. Vandalism Activities that destroy, deface, or beautify public and private property generally fall under the category of vandalism. Tagging up buildings, train cars, and other surfaces continue to be a strong Black artistic tradition and is one of the five elements of hip hop culture. The New York City crackdown on graffiti artists in the 80s and 90s notoriously imprisoned many Black artists and reinforced the illegality of tagging. Although graffiti is slightly more accepted (and gentrified) today, it is still generally outlawed especially when the artists are Black. Other **activities that** also **fall under vandalism include sabotage, arson, and** general **property damage.** **Vandalism continues to be used** strategically by Black people **to forestall** the encroachment of **gentrification in the Black community.** Furthermore, **property damage that targets white businesses, institutions, and personal holdings is** in **direct resistance to white supremacist capitalism** and is a strong Blaqillegalist praxis. **Vandalism** is also a key component of revolutionary activities and **employs the use of sabotage and arson** in particular **to further** the project of **Black liberation**. Inciting to Riot **Any** unauthorized public gathering could generally be interpreted as a **riot under the law**. Historically however Black unauthorized gatherings have always been more likely to be read as riots since the age of the slave codes. Anti-riot laws are another legal residue of slave law, which outlawed Black public assembly of any kind and saw it as a threat to white safety. Over the course of racial history and as consistent Black revolts ensued, legal precedents adopted from slave law became codified in the language surrounding rioting and inciting to riot. Black people have been breaking this law since we have arrived in the Americas as both a feature of Black social life, and as moments of Black uprising. From the countless uprisings during and after slavery, the race riots of 1919, the 1943 Detroit riots, the 1965 Watts riots, 1968 race riots, the 1969 Stonewall uprising, the 1992 LA riots, to the contemporary uprisings in Ferguson and Baltimore, rioting fits squarely within the Black radical tradition and is a part of Blaqillegalist praxis. Treason. Treason is legally defined as **any activity that is an act of war against the state, seeks to destroy the state, overthrow the state, or collude with its enemies.** These include espionage, sabotage, and some forms of terrorism. **Black revolutionary activities** that seek the elimination of the white supremacist state as a requirement for Black liberation **are marked as acts of treason by the law.** If the state is the principal instrument of anti-Black oppression, which props up white supremacy and facilitates colonialism and imperialism, then it is the state who has already waged war on Black people. Similar to the BLA, a **Blaqillegalist praxis rejects the legitimacy of the white court of law** in its entirety and **recognizes it as an extension of the state’s undeclared war on Blackness**. Black people tend to fight for their liberation and fighting for liberation means fighting to destroy the state that oppresses us and subjects us to super-exploitation. Black revolutionary activity breaks the law by definition. Those **criminal activities that do not lend themselves to Black liberation or survival would not constitute a Blaqillegalist praxis** and would be considered counterrevolutionary. Although these still might be understood as fugitive in so far as they are still acts of flight from the law and possess a quality of refusal that is innate to Blackness, the refusal does not present itself as a gesture towards freedom. Criminal activity that steals from poor and working-class Black people, murders indiscriminately, peddles self-destructive drugs into the community, engages in domestic violence, assault, rape, and other violence especially against femmes and LBGTQIA people, do direct harm to Black people and could not be said to be Blaqillegalist. Much of this activity invites increased police repression in Black communities, foster unsafe environments for Black people, and is generally never for the collective wellbeing of Black people on the ground. A Blaqillegalist position must remain critical of counterrevolutionary Black illegal forms which very often are encouraged by the state because they destroy the social fabric of Black communities and make them easier to police and contain. This is a distinct turn away from the individualist line of white illegalism which makes no distinctions between revolutionary and counterrevolutionary illegal acts and puts emphasis on personal freedom. Where the centrality of the individual drives the actions of the white illegalist, the Blaqillegalist is driven by the pursuit of collective freedom for Black people everywhere and locates individual illegal activity as grounded within the collective struggle for Black liberation. It understands and situates individual **Black illegal acts** as **operating** **within the matrix** of countless moments **of refusal and flight** taking place all over the African diaspora and across past, present, and future temporalities. For the Blaqillegalist, no illegal activity we engage in occurs in isolation and is intimately connected with our local and global contexts as well as our history, immediate present, and afro future.

**We will follow the teachings of Black Panther Party and Black Liberation army and engage in tactics such as looting which challenge state legitimacy and**

**Gale Libraries ‘No Date**

<https://www.gale.com/binaries/content/assets/gale-us-en/primary-sources/archives-unbound/primary-sources_archives-unbound_black-liberation-army-and-the-program-of-armed-struggle.pdf> The Black Liberation Army (BLA) was an underground, black nationalist-Marxist militant organization that operated from 1970 to 1981. Composed largely of former Black Panthers (BPP), **the organization’s** program wasone of "armed struggle" and its stated **goal was to "take up arms for the liberation and self-determination of black people in the U**nited **S**tates." **The BLA carried out** a series of **bombings, robberies** (what participants termed "expropriations"), **and prison breaks** .If one were to examine, African American history, one would be surprised to find a long history of militant armed struggle. Slave rebellions, urban "guerilla" activities in the 1960s, rural defense leagues, were all part of a tapestry of black militancy. An icon of black armed struggle, the Black Liberation Army, was a linchpin in understanding the development of the "armed rebellion" phenomenon in the late 1960s through early 1980s. **The idea of the Black Liberation Army emerged from** conditions in African American communities: **conditions of poverty, indecent housing, massive unemployment, poor medical care, and inferior education**. The BLA arose because of the political, social, and economic oppression of felt by African American people in the urban areas. The Black Liberation Army gained strength as Black Panther Party membership declined. By 1970, police and pressure from the FBI’s COINTELPRO program, infiltration, sectarianism, the criminalization of the Black Power movement (including long prison sentences and the deaths of key members) had crippled the Black Panther Party. This convinced many former party members of the desirability of an underground existence, including the assumption that a new period of violent repression was at hand. BLA members operated under the belief that **only through covert means**, including but **not limited to violent acts**, could the movement be continued until such a time when an above-ground existence was possible. In this sense, the BLA’s reasoning was similar to that of the Weather Underground. 2 The conditions under which the Black Liberation Army formed are not entirely clear. It is commonly believed that the organization was founded by those who left the Black Panther Party after Eldridge Cleaver was expelled from the party’s Central Committee. Others, including black revolutionary Geronimo Pratt, asserted that the BLA "as a movement concept pre-dated and was broader than the BPP", suggesting that it was a refuge for ex-Panthers rather than a new organization formed through schism. The clandestine nature of the BLA does not mean it was marginal or fringe. Nothing could be further from the truth, according to some, throughout the 1970’s — its highpoint of activity — the BLA was involved in numerous clandestine actions. Heavily influenced by MarxistLeninist philosophies and Fanonian readings on anti-colonialism, **the B**lack **L**iberation **A**rmy **saw "revolutionary violence" against the state as a necessary response to** what their members deemed **an imperialist nation fixed on exclusivity and racism.** White radicals were also involved in clandestine activity, in many cases collaborating with black radicals. The best-known group of this era, the Weather Underground, actively participated on the side of black activists.

#### 

**Following Black radicals before us Blaqillegalist and anarkata praxis**

**Anarkata**: A Statement Oct. 12, 20**19** <https://afanarchists.wordpress.com/2019/10/12/anarkata-a-statement/>

Western modernity. **Whiteness fears and dreads this apocalypse** perhaps even more than the prospects of an ecological Armageddon, more than the environmental disaster it finds itself still the privileged subject of. For Blackness heralds the end of the white as a privileged subject entirely. Blackness is the fertile ground on which the world stands, and **when we rise**, so too will **the world built upon us crumble**. **Out of the ashes** this apocalypse **come countless Afro-futures waiting to be**; wondrous, speculative universes **where Black people are free and push the boundaries of what is possible**. Perhaps there is a future where Black people live on floating cities after the consequences of climate change cause sea levels to rise. Or maybe we will live in atmospheric cities high above the clouds caused by a nuclear winter. In a future where the ozone layer is gone, perhaps we will live in subterranean Afrikan villages. Or maybe we are nomadic tree-planters, terraforming the Earth after its desertification. Imagine a future where there are billions of genders, each with their own temple dedicated to them and their own community of disciples. Imagine stargazing sisterhoods, time traveling ancestors, and intergalactic maroon communities. Imagine interstellar voyages aboard the Black Star space shuttle, or perhaps a cosmic Harlem Renaissance. Imagine futures where the human has disappeared and has made way for the emergence of a new being. **Anarkata asks us to dream of Black possibilities that have not yet been imagined**. From the end of the world comes **new ways of being, new ways of living, new visions of freedom**. But we don't have to use our imaginations to dream up those futures; the evidence of them can be seen in our struggle today. From the growing concern for the most vulnerable in our communities, to the exchange of mutual aid for our survival, to the political education of our people, and the flexible responsiveness of our movements, the formations that emerge in our communities and the small and large ways we take back autonomy and kinship with the land, water, and soil—these are all precursors to our Afro-future. Anarkata envisions **Afro-futures where all Black people are free to express their bodily autonomy, where Black nonmen are honored and at the fore, where disabled Black people are accommodated and validated.** We foresee horizontal futures **where hierarchy is abolished, and collaboration occurs across people, localities, and networks**. We foresee **the abolition of prisons** and the emergence of communal arbitration to settle disputes. We envision autonomous localities that govern themselves through direct democracy, critique, and consensus. We foresee futures **where the people have access to their needs** and are not subject to bare survivalism, exploitation, or intracommunal violence. We envision communal and liberatory education for our children. And we envision **a Black masses who have the political education and leadership capacity to be autonomous.** **These futures are not utopias where no problems exist**, but **they are futures** in which our adaptability to new problems are **heightened by the strength and health of our communities. It is up to us to build these futures** and lay the groundwork for them today. It is the Black revolutionary work of today that will nurture the possibilities of an Afro-future tomorrow. In giving a name to the contours of Anarkata, its tradition, politics, and praxis, we hope to locate aspects of that expansive work that are already being done in the total liberation of our people. This statement hopes to encapsulate the range of ideas and approaches that have animated the Anarkata Turn and bring them together into one document. The document is merely an offering in that direction; a starting point, or perhaps, a midway point in what might become the corpus of Anarkata thought and politics. This document is also a work in progress: it is living, grows, and is transformed as new insights around its contents (and its missteps) are made and new approaches unearthed. It is a document that enters into conversation with all those who identify with its contents, and is improved upon by doing so. It is intended to be just as flexible and collaborative as the movements we hope to build. We invite the reader to use this document in whatever ways they might find useful to push forward the project of Black liberation in their own communities. Finally, this document is an expression of love: an undying love for our people, love for our comrades, and a love of freedom. It is this love that turns us towards Anarkata. In this same vein, **alongside** the emphasis on **mutual aid**, Anarkatas also **recognize theft as a logical response to the conditions of oppression** that the people will organically turn toward as a means not only to secure the resources needed for our survival but undermine the forces of white supremacist capitalism. **Since our people and resources have been systematically plundered from the African continent** by the West, and since we will never legally gain the reparations that are owed to us **because the injury done to Black people is both illegible to the law** and cannot be properly calculated, Anarkatas say that **Black people can and should pursue every means** to reclaim those reparations from white people for the damages done from slavery and colonialism, including extralegal activities. Anarkatas do not support stealing from our own people, and certainly not from our most vulnerable community members. We also do not support capitalist exploitation of our people by our own people’s hands, which is also stealing from our community. **We** do however **support the looting, petty theft, and expropriation of largescale corporations, fortune 500 companies, state institutions, gentrifying storefronts, and other colonizing industries.** Moreover, **Anarkatas defend the need for militancy in our push for accessibility,** including in **the expropriation of necessary medical supplies to support our Black elderly, Black disabled, Black trans women, and all others in our community** who need them by any means necessary. The pursuit of reparations through extralegal means, the expropriation of white institutions and the redistribution of those resources to our communities is strong Anarkata praxis. **Anarkatas see rioting to be an understandable response to the continued racism, oppression, and exploitation Black people are subjected to under the state**—which the people will organically turn toward. For centuries, it has been an expression of our discontent with the intolerable conditions of Black life. Within that history, we have also observed rioting as a means to both expropriate and redistribute resources to our communities, and cause widespread damage to white property. We do not support the looting or destruction of poor and working-class Black communities and advise against this. However, Anarkatas recognize that **rioting has been a technology used by our people in strategic ways to forestall gentrification, destroy white property, dislocate occupying forces in our communities, sabotage capitalist interests, sustain revolutionary movements and redistribute resources to our communities**. We recognize that wherever it occurs, rioting is most revolutionary and has the best praxis when used in these strategic ways. Anarkatas do not condone riot shaming of our people, and instead see rioting as a tradition of collective dissent belonging to the legacy of Black resistance throughout our history. Sabotage is another aspect of Anarkata praxis that is dynamic and useful in a variety of ways to push forward Black liberation in our communities. **Since** the days of **slavery**, **Black people have been conducting sabotage** to resist the terms of our bondage, intentionally undermine capitalist production, and conduct revolutionary struggle. **Sabotage encompasses a wide array of Black transgressive and extralegal activities** we might engage in, **and can include anything from petty theft, to massive worker strikes**. It is a decentralized activity that anyone can carry out at any time. **There are five main categories of sabotage** relevant to Black liberation. **Cyber sabotage** involves the intentional tampering of computer and network systems and hardware, where **communication sabotage** involves the disruption of the flow of information via correspondence, email, phone, and spreading of misinformation. **Industrial sabotage** involves activities that disrupt the flow of capitalist production and are conducted by workers and consumers. **Infrastructural sabotage** are any activities that disturb the material systems and functions of institutions, structures, roadways, and equipment. Finally, **military sabotage** is any activity done to disrupt the police and military’s ability to act. The use of these methods of sabotage done either independently or coordinated with other activities are generally good praxis as long as they are conducted responsibly. Anarkatas also understand the use of sabotage to be an inevitable response to our oppression as people struggle to obtain resources, protect our communities, undermine capitalism, resist law enforcement and other occupying forces, and wage revolutionary struggle against the oppressor. Anarkatas believe that **Black people have a right to fight for our liberation** through armed revolutionary struggle because the position we are forced into as a people make armed conflict inevitable. So long as the artifices of the white supremacist state continue to stand, Black communities will always be antagonized by forms of white terror and state violence. In the words of the Black Liberation Army “**we must not only build alternative social, economic, and political institutions, but we must intentionally sabotage, overload, and destroy existing ruling class institutions in the process**”. The development of a Black armed front is a logical and valid response aimed at abolishing the order of oppression from our communities and carrying out the revolutionary program of the people. We believe that differing political circumstances, climate, geography, and local conditions will all determine the character and shape of an armed movement in any given locality, but that there should be a few key features. The armed front should emanate from our people, be beholden to our people, and be supported by our people. Such an armed front should be free of hierarchy and honor the leadership and participation of women and nonmen who desire to pick up arms and enter in the struggle. The toxic gun culture that incubates in armed cadres should be actively abolished and replaced with a culture of revolutionary love. The armed front should conduct its activities underground in order to minimize counterinsurgency measures and it should consist of small groups of fighters in order to minimize infiltration. Small groupings of fighters also increase the speed, flexibility and responsiveness of the front as a whole. Employing guerrilla tactics, such groupings might wage revolution horizontally, operating autonomously and collaborating with each other across groupings without a centralized axis. Finally, its activities should not be irresponsible lest it put our people in immediate danger. During the later stages of revolutionary struggle, armed movements would be key in liberating territories, establishing autonomous zones, and striking decisive blows to the white power structure.

#### **Rioting and other Blaqillegalist tactics are the most effective tools of resistance and securing the improvement of the material conditions of Black people**

**By Shemon and Arturo, 17 November 2020**

CARS, RIOTS & BLACK LIBERATION <https://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/cars-riots-black-liberation>

The main people who take the uprising seriously are the [rIght](https://youtu.be/cQeW7RPkCZQ) and a small layer of the ultra-left. For liberals and moderates the insurrectionary dimension of the uprising barely exists, since [93 percent of the protests have been baptized as peaceful](https://time.com/5886348/report-peaceful-protests/). Using this statistical sleight of hand, **liberalism transforms itself into an ally of black people, equating Black Lives Matter with respectable,** non-violent, legal protest, while ignoring the remaining 7 percent of violent protests, i.e. the actual riots. Even socialists have stuck their heads in the sand when it comes to the tactical and strategic implications of the uprising. **Everyone condemns racism and police brutality, but** for all their claims of solidarity with black liberation, **most leftists have fallen miserably short when it comes to** actually participating in the **riots** that have swept this country. At best, **most abstain from the insurrectionary aspects of the uprising altogether**; at worst, **they opportunistically leech off of it** in order to build up their particular organizations, brands, and careers. **Meanwhile, black proletarians are** getting arrested and **putting their bodies on the line** in a battle of life and death. At this point in the development of the struggle, **any group that claims solidarity with black liberation**, **but has not been** fighting the cops and **rioting** in the streets, **or directly providing aid and support** to such activities, **is irrelevant**. There are no excuses. We have met women, children, parents, elders, undocumented people, people in wheelchairs, on crutches, coming from all genders, abilities, and races imaginable, all throwing down in one way or another during street riots. For those who engage the police in battle, **the time for words** and social media posts **are over**. **This kind of symbolic anti-racism and solidarity** – which has been the bread and butter of liberals and leftists for decades now – has been exposed for the **joke** that it really is. **Solidarity with the movement requires risking your skin.** This is not an abstraction; this is exactly what black proletarians are doing. And it is not only the white, Asian, indigenous, and latinx left that ignores the most dynamic and militant aspects of this uprising, it is also the major black intellectuals and radicals of our time. This should be no surprise, as a similar split occurred among radical intellectuals during World War I in the Second International and again in national liberation struggles during World War II and after. For all the radical rhetoric of marxism, in terms of its actual deeds and practice, most of the radical left has accommodated itself to the status quo. **The law has expanded in response to class conflicts and anti-racist struggles** to the point that plenty of harmless forms of activism can be engaged in, but they are simply a new prison for activists and movements. Previous generations have won victories and expanded the law so that we can safely denounce wars, march almost anywhere we wish, and say whatever we want. This range of **legality** seems like a victory, but **has** also **become a trap that leftist organizations treat as a principle**. The fact of the matter is that leftist organizations are simply not prepared to deal with the illegal nature of the revolutionary struggles and politics that are taking place in the present moment. The black proletariat continues to show a practical commitment to fighting the police, setting fire to carceral infrastructure, and looting the commodities of this dying capitalist system. When these are the tactics of the proletariat in motion, what kind of organizational forms make sense? **Organizational, tactical, and strategic clarity is** emerging for the first time since the 1960s, but it is not coming from the left – it is **coming from the practical initiatives and strategies of the black proletariat**. Leftists run their mouths about organizational questions in abstract and antiquated terms, regurgitating a played out formula modeled on Russia or China that has been repeated ad nauseam for many decades now, but which has produced little more than sects and cults. They ignore the concrete forms of revolutionary organization that are already taking place in the uprising. Revolutionary organizations are not built in the abstract, but are expressions of the real tactical and strategic challenges raised by the proletariat in the class struggle. The fundamental organizational question that revolutionaries face is how to contribute and relate to the uprising, specifically in terms of street fighting, looting, and other riot tactics. **Those who are truly committed to revolution** **will have to** push past the stale organizational forms of the past and **begin to account for the diverse, illegal, and creative** organizational **forms that the black proletariat is developing** in the present, the use of cars being one of the most innovative and effective tools in this emerging tactical repertoire. It cannot be completely spontaneous that black proletarians went to WalMart, looted it, and when the cops arrived, evaded them and went on to form caravans that targeted different shopping districts throughout the city. Much of the official prognosis of this moment is that the rioters are unorganized, lack direction, and leadership. In truth, the reality is that **there’s a high degree of coordination and organization within the maelstrom of the riot.** This should be obvious when caravans of looters swarm specific locations at the same time. To do so, people collectively decide on specific targets, coordinate movement to the target area, and often set up look outs who will warn everyone else when the police are coming.

#### **CASE:**

#### **The 1AC begins with an ethos of transparency in the form of relational possibility – this orientation relies on a ruse of analogy between subjugated populations, mandating a perverse means of anti-black coalition-building which culminates in liberal diversity management and colonial deathmaking—turns case**

# Feldman 16 Keith P Feldman, assistant professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, PhD from the University of Washington, 2016, “On Relationality, On Blackness: A Listening Post,” *Comparative Literature* Volume 68 Number 2)

# **Yet, even** as relationality garners a certain kind of scholarly momentum, countervailing tendencies caution against its universalization**.** Think of these as not simply going against the relational by positing narrow parochialisms whose object is at best a fictive autocthony**.** Rather, think of them as ante-relational: as that which enunciates**, in Yumi Pak’s words,** “outside relationality.”Such approaches recognize how the epistemological transparency of the minoritized subject is forged and honed in the longstanding expression of **what Denise Ferreira Da Silva terms Enlightenment reason’s** “raciality”: those moral statements on the contours of the “human” that oscillate between stuttering denunciation and full-throated legitimation of conquest, enslavement, dispossession, and evisceration**.** These formations of violence create the conditions of possibility for relation in the modern world precisely because they inaugurate the modern world as such**.** Revealing interconnections only as a play of visible surfaces hazards obscuring such foundational forces**.** To mobilize a critique of raciality thus requires a refusal of what Frank Wilderson calls the “ruse of analogy”: the trick such forms of commensuration play in obscuring both the generality of world-ordering violence and the specificity of captivity and embodied violation and degradation of enslavement**.** Such structuralist accounts of domination offer a critical short-circuit to any liberal or radical formulations of relationality**.** Here, Blackness emerges out of an antagonism with the unequally arrayed category of non-Blackness **(Sexton),** while formulations of indigeneity are produced through transhistorical modalities of settler colonial invasion, conquest, and transfer **(Wolfe). As Jodi Byrd underscores, indigenous claims to legal and territorial forms of sovereignty are over-written when internal colonialism marks the primary conceptual grounds from which race radical movements articulate the narrative horizons of liberation. While racial demarcation has lubricated the production of colonial knowledges as a protean marker of indigenous difference, enfolding the discourse of indigeneity into that of race casts national or tribal dreams, desires, and histories as excess, as that which falls outside the scope, outside the frame.** Projects of coalition have the propensity to unwittingly smuggle in the same erasure of anti-Blackness **(Sexton)** and settler colonial violence that the liberal state enunciates through its logic of inclusion**. In this line of thinking,** decolonization as an ongoing ethical relation to indigenous futurities falls away as the liberal state comes to manage the terms of anti-racism**. In other words, as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang emphasize,** the terms of social justice and decolonization are essentially antagonistic; their incommensurability serves as a point of departure for research, praxis, and engagement**. The social is always already a scene of presumptive relation, and particularly relation’s ongoing iterability, transferability, and structured (if also improvised) performance (Butler). The social is where heterogeneity reckons with differentiation, where the hierarchical effects of force relations are elaborated, navigated, negotiated, contested, and transformed. Ethics are prompted by the scene of the social. But** the social, as scholarship on coloniality and social death reminds us, concomitantly signifies relation’s foundational conditionality**. That is,** the social as it has been rendered through coloniality has already been structured in advance by the elaboration of modernity’s engines of fatality: captivity, confinement, and genocide **(Rodríguez).** Coloniality iterates **what Nelson Maldonado-Torres calls** a “death-ethics of war,” wherein relation is routinely precluded by a pathological will towards conquest**.** If being in relation (a relational ontology) in the transAtlantic world is understood as both an ethics and the fashioning of a phenomenology, then the conditions of possibility for relation are the foundational worldings that are made in conquest and enslavement**.** Are these two sides to the scene of the social reconcilable? Their divergent temporalities would suggest otherwise**.** If the former has invited (or been conscripted into) the narration of progress through the linear telling of liberal democracy, the latter renders the ways the social is articulated through the production of that which is out-of-time, out-of-joint, on hold**.** Because the latter is thought to emerge out of, and reproduces, that hold**—**the site that marks the transit of captive bodies and their circulation through the space of the auction block, the plantation, the convict-lease system, the ghetto, and the prison **(Childs)—**it is foundationally and intentionally incommensurate with the place-making of the former **(McKittrick).**

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#### **The Aff is only capable of offering redress for the suffering of civil society’s junior partners, but in that moment, actively foreclose the impossible demands necessary to dismantle the antagonism that positions blackness in an ontological state of slaveness.**

# Wilderson 03. Frank Wilderson, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Drama at UC Irvine, PhD in Rhetoric and Film Studies from UC Berkeley, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal,” *Social Justice*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (92), War, Dissent, and Justice: A Dialogue (2003), pg. 18-19, ar

# The Black experience in this country has been a phenomenon without analog. —Eugene Genovese (Boston Review, October/ November 1993)

# There is something organic to black positionality that makes it essential to the destruction of civil society. **There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around:** there is something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the black body. Blackness is a positionality of “absolute dereliction” **(Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society,** and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established, through hegemonic interventions. Blackness cannot become one of civil society’s many junior partners: Black citizenship, or Black civic obligation, are oxymorons.**In light of this, coalitions and social movements,** even radical social movements like **the** Prison Abolition **Movement,** bound up in the solicitation of hegemony, so as to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of civil society, ultimately accommodate only the satiable demands and finite antagonisms of civil society’s junior partners (i.e., immigrants, white women, and the working class), but foreclose upon the insatiable demands and endless antagonisms of the prison slave and the prison-slave-in-waiting. **In short,** whereas such coalitions and social movements cannot be called the outright handmaidens of white supremacy, their rhetorical structures and political desire are underwritten by a supplemental anti-Blackness.**In her autobiography,** Assata Shakur**’s comments vacillate between being interesting and insightful to painfully programmatic and “responsible.” The expository method of conveyance accounts for this air of responsibility. However, toward the end of the book, she** accounts for coalition work by way of extended narrative as opposed to exposition. We accompany her on one of Zayd Shakur’s many Panther projects with outside groups, work “dealing with white support groups who were involved in raising bail for the Panther 21 members in jail” **(Shakur, 1987: 224).** With no more than three words, her recollection becomes matter of fact and unfiltered. She writes, “i hated it.” **At the time, i felt that anything below 110th street was another country. All my activities were centered in Harlem and i almost never left it. Doing defense committee work was definitely not up my alley....** i hated standing around while all these white people asked me to explain myself, my existence, i became a master of the one-liner. **(Shakur, 1987: 224)Her hatred of this work is bound up in her anticipation, fully realized, of all the zonal violations to come when a white woman asks her if Zayd is her “panther...you know, is he your black cat?” and then runs her fingers through Assata’s hair to cop a kinky feel. Her narrative anticipates these violations-to-come at the level of the street, as well as at the level of the body.**Here is the moment in her life as a prison-slave-in-waiting, which is to say, a moment as an ordinary Black person, when she finds herself among “friends”—abolitionists, at least partners in purpose, and yet she feels it necessary to adopt the same muscular constriction, the same coiled anticipation, the same combative “one-liners” that she will need to adopt just one year later to steel herself against the encroachment of prison guards. The verisimilitude between Assata’s well-known police encounters, and her experiences in civil society’s most nurturing nook, the radical coalition, raises disturbing questions about political desire, Black positionality, and hegemony as a modality of struggle.

#### **When faced with the affirmative’s advocacy, the alternative responds not with rejection but simply the phrase “mu” – this is an unasking of the affirmative that refuses the 1AC’s political telos.**

# Wilderson and Moten 12 (Frank Wilderson, Frank B Wilderson III, associate professor of African American Studies and Drama at UC Irvine, PhD in Rhetoric and Film Studies from UC Berkeley, Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies at the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD from UC Berkeley, November 6 2012, Q&A from after the presentation of an early draft of “Blackness and Nothingness” at UC Irvine, transcribed from two videos: 2:29-11:02 of<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3NW_fXun-8> and 0:00 to 7:30 of<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWYLz36wqR8>) gz

# **Wilderson:** How should we think about the protocols of psychoanalysis that run through Fanon’s work**, given what you’ve said today about pidgin languages—**and not these protocols on their own terms, but what he does with these protocols **and what David Marriott, in particular—bringing in another perhaps-Afropessimist**? **So I’m thinking about the end of the essay “Fanon’s War,”** where Marriott says “what do you do with an unconscious that appears to hate you,” **and** I read the words “appears to hate you” in a **kind of** double-way**.** It *appears* perhaps to hate you and also that *when the unconscious appears*, it hates you**, so that** the metaphor **that you talked about that** Jared talked about in his article**—**about the guy coming on stage, intervening in the intramural space**—**is precisely how Marriott talks about the condition of the Black unconscious**.** There’s this constant dislocation that means **perhaps** it cannot become an unconscious because dislocation is such that Blackness cannot generate its own ego-ideal**. So he takes Fanon’s work and then leaves Fanon’s reading of disalienation aside to analytic work without gesturing toward prescription, if that’s what you’re doing. So I’m wondering: can this gap be calibrated or is it a gap or should we think about what you’ve done today and what Marriott does in a kind of creative tension?**

# **Moten: Well, if I understand what David’s doing and also the question, then I see the tension as less…**What psychoanalytic tools allow both Fanon and David to discover is precisely this inability or incapacity for an ego-ideal in Blackness**. And then I think** this is the place**, in my mind,** where they both would deviate from psychoanalytic protocols and practices, precisely in deviating from**—let’s say—what I would call** the normativity of Freudian prescription, which is “okay, how do we fix this?”.And the answer that **I think** they both approach is “we don’t fix this.” **That,** what instead we do, in a way that exceeds psychoanalysis**—I think—**is to first of all provide a much more accurate and thorough-going understanding and even**, you could say,** diagnosis of the ego-ideal as a kind of imposition**. And, again, I think** this is where you **can** see in Fanon, a deviation both from psychoanalytic protocol and from phenomenological protocol, where on the level of psychoanalytical protocol we would talk about the idea of an ego or ego-ideal, phenomenologically we would talk about transcendental subjectivity**.** In either case, we are barred**.** We do not have this capacity**. And then,** the normative, the prescriptive level**, from within those norms or from within the normativity** of those discourses would be “well, how do you get one?,” and they’re not interested in that, and I’m not interested in that either**. And** it doesn’t mean I’m not interested in something **I guess you talk about** under the rubric of “prescription”**—and this is where, again, David’s work, you work, Jared, Fanon allow us to see things maybe I had not understood, maybe like in Du Bois and in Douglass, and going all the way back, where I’m kinda going “okay,** what’s at stake is how to begin to provide a better understanding of **what now—the language we have now to talk about this is now is the language of absence—**what is this absence of an ego ideal?What are its features?What are its qualities?How does it work?What happens there?How does it exist as a mode of living in the world?How does it exist as a mode of study?How does it exist**, frankly, in my understanding at least,** as an alternative to the world insofar as it is constructed out of and by the impulse and the imposition of the ego-ideal, which is radically, brutally, viciously interdicted for Blacks as the void of our subjectivity? **But which, I think, the work of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault have established that it is, in a different way, by way of different means, in different forms of brutality, there’s a general interdiction. And we’ll have to talk about** this**, because I want to know what you think, because I think I might be misusing a term that for me** is **so important in your work—the notion of** *antagonism***, and distinction between antagonism and conflict, and to talk about that antagonism as** the antagonism **that** structures the relationship between Blacks and civil society, between Blacks and the world, between Blacks and what Fanon calls “the morbid universe” and its production of “the morbid body.” **And this is kind of what I was getting at in that sorta aside about “privilege.” When…when Theodore Roosevelt—nah, that’s a different thing. But what I’ll say is this: what’s at stake is recognizing what I tended to call, along with my friend Steve Harney—we write stuff together—the notion of a general antagonism. Which is to say there’s a very specific and particular antagonism that exists between Blacks and civil society, and then there’s the general antagonism that** *is* **civil society, which manifests as all the different ways in which we’ve got people who have the ego-ideal imposed upon them, who live within a political structure which utterly denies the capacity to construct this ego-ideal. Now we are barred from it and excluded from it.**

# [Video cuts to next part]

# **Moten: …which is maybe part of the reason why** Black thought attains, in general, the name of thought, itself, where what it is to think is to precisely think our way out of this imposition**. I mean and this is how come I’ve been reading kinda—and I talked a little bit about it yesterday—reading Deleuze and reading Deleuze’s stuff on Hume. It’s really about…I guess to put it in, not simpler terms, but more direct terms,** Black thought knows something about life outside of the field it is constructed by and in relation to possessive individualism**. That’s what I meant when I said in certain writings that** it’s a *general critique of the proper***. So I don’t see…the difference. If there’s a tension between** what David’s doing **and what I’m trying to do, it’s not a tension, for me. It’s more like his work** is part of that work which I depend upon **as allowing me** to get to the point where I can start trying to study what it is to exist in absence**. So** if ontology doesn’t work for us**—**if it’s interdicted, the question of the meaning of being is not our question**—**then what we do in our thought is we unask that question**.** We don’t answer it**. You know I’ve been thinking about this in relation to the whole notion of apposition, in this thing I wrote a long time ago called “Knowledge of Freedom.” It’s** when Mary Pritchard’s owner comes up to her and asks**—he found out Mary Pritchard was trying to figure out some way to buy herself, to buy her freedom—he’s like** “who are you, bitch, to think about freedom?”**. And** Mary Pritchard responds “freedom is very sweet.”She unasks the question**. In a similar sense,** in Equiano**, you sell Equiano from one captor to another, Equiano’s like on one ship—**here’s some guy who comes he’s never seen before**, right?** This guy’s like “do you know who I am?”You don’t answer that question!You don’t answer that question**.** The answer is the answer, no matter what**.** Any answer is the answer that he wants**.** Because knowing who he is is capitulation to the demand that the question imposes**: “I am not you. I am who I am because you’re that.” “Yeah I’m your master. You’ve never seen me before but you** *must* **know who I am.” And this is what’s…like mu.** That term “mu,” in Japanese philosophy, in the theological discourses around Zen Buddhism, could be translated as “nothingness”, but in Zen there’s these theological questions that come up around what constitutes Buddha-nature**.** So the question is “can a dog have Buddha-nature?” and the answer to the question is “mu,” because the answer to the question is you can’t ask the question**.** You unask the question**.** It’s an unasking of the question**.** It’s within that space of the unasking of the question of the meaning of being**.** And what we do is we refuse**.** We situate ourselves appositionally, in our movement: in apposition to the question of the problematic of ego-ideal and the world that gets constructed by it**.** That’s what **I think** Glissant is talking about when he talks about “consent not to be a single being” and the Middle Passage as the field of this consent, the hold as the space of this consent**. And of course, none of this—and I’ll try to say something about this—none of this—**the first thing you have to recognize is the *absolute incapacity* to describe the depths of the brutality that correspond to this being-barred from the ego-ideal**.** It’s like if someone said “what’s the worst thing we could do?” and then you went **like** ten steps beyond that**. But by the same token—so that** it’s not possible to describe it, there’s no language which is adequate for it**.** But **what’s interesting is that what we do…what I’m beginning to believe is that** we do have some language that’s adequate for what it is in Blackness that is irreducible to its relegation**. And this is why, again, maybe the best way to think about this is is all at the level of how we negotiate, in each of our work, the relationship between maybe a kind of artistic impulse and a critical impulse, because David’s a great poet, and poetry is, for me, the field in which we actually have some kind of…and art, more generally, is the space in which we have some way of articulating the relationship between the nothingness that is imposed, as Wallace Stevens would say “the nothingness that is not there, the nothingness that is” in that poem, “The Snow Man.” So** I wouldn’t even think about it as a tension between David and me, as just maybe **the differences between** the different ways that we both understand that tension in our work, in *our work***.** It’s not between him and me**—**the tension is there in what each of us do**.** And there’s a difference in terms of the way in which we each work that tension, and negotiate that tension**—**not resolve it, because to resolve it would be to turn off the engine**.**

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#### **Black Nihilism K:**

**AT Perm**

**AT PERM**

### **Only Black people can truly end the world that Anti-Blackness what they try to theorize through is still built by anti-Blackness. You can flow this on the Case for as well**

**Anarkata**: A Statement Oct. 12, 20**19** <https://afanarchists.wordpress.com/2019/10/12/anarkata-a-statement/>

To What End? The End of the World: **This world we have come to know**, the world which **was born out of the destruction of Africa** and the emergence of the Black, **born of the ungendering of our bodies** and their transformation into property, birth **out of the free labor and sweat of our ancestors**, as Frantz Fanon put it, **this Manichean world must finally come to an end**. It is a world divided into compartments, borders and partitions, where the ordering principle is captivity and extreme forms violence. **It is a world of cisheterosexual domination, white supremacist patriarchy, and ableist oppression**. It is a world **of military occupations, multinational corporations, prisons and modern-day plantations.** It is a world of universalized white symbolisms, theologies and philosophies. It is **a world that is white, where** Western imperialism and colonialism have greatly extended the reach of the West with catastrophic results for third world people and for the environment. It is a world where **capitalist extraction of resources and the pollution** left in its wake threaten to **hurl us towards climate disaster**. This is the world we have inherited and the world in which we are fighting to survive. W**hat we are fighting for**, (and to what end) **is not to make this world** we inherited **better**, improve upon its structures, **or even to change it in a radical sense**. **Our end goal is to end it**, that is to say, **its end is our beginning**.This world of modernity, **the world that slavery, capitalism, and colonialism built,** rests on top of the material Earth, but **is not of the Earth**. **The world-making processes of capitalism, colonialism, and imperialism have racialized, gendered, objectified and ravaged the Earth,** transforming it into the raw materials for capital itself. In turn, capitalism has tried to naturalize its logics, claiming that the violence and aggression at the center of its processes are governed by the same laws as the natural world. The social Darwinist notion that the Earth is governed by the “survival of the fittest” is another piece of capitalist propaganda used to justify colonial exploitation by extending and conflating the ordering principles of the world with that of the environment. But we say **the “Earth” and the “world” are two fundamentally different things** that are diametrically opposed: one is exploited and degraded to fuel the continued existence of the other. The Earth is a sustainable collection of interconnected ecosystems, the world is an unsustainable mass of structures and institutions driven by consumption and exploitation. The Earth is a living, breathing organism, where the world is a social invention, a man-made parasite that feeds upon the Earth and produces the human as its only subject at the center of the world. Put differently, the popular sentiment that “the world is cruel” is not a discourse on the Earth, but a reference to the world: **the world is that social invention which is constituted by abject cruelty**. Where modern environmental movements conflate the Earth and the world, we say that **the world antagonizes the Earth** and argue that the only means to stop the process of climate change which threatens to destroy the Earth, is to liquidate the world and abolish it from our future. In this way, what we mean by the end of the world is not the end of our planet, but the end of that world which threatens to destroy our planet. From the moment our ancestors were stolen and incorporated into the structure of white supremacist capitalism, the seeds were planted for its eventual doom. For if **the modern world** is a social invention, then it **was born through the enslavement of the African and the pillaging of the African continent.** African slave labor is the foundation of the modern world, which historically provided the conditions of possibility for western capitalism, colonialism, imperialism and humanism. **Blackness built the world and continues to sustain it, but cannot be a part of it, or have a proper place within it.** **The displacement of Blackness**, this exclusion from the world, this other-worldliness, **is a key feature that positions Black people as the agents of world destruction.** For **the end of the human and the world** that centers it **cannot be brought about by the (colonial) human** itself; **there is nothing about the (hu)Man that can be revolutionary**. **That work belongs to an entirely different being**, one who has been scorned by the human and the world. **Blackness is apocalyptic**: our very skin a sign of the apocalypse that is coming for

**No perms – complete abandonment of the human is necessary – attempts to rethink the human-only sustain the ontological terror through forgetting the question of black ~~being.~~ You can also extend the Anarkata 19 card that talks about how only black people can end the World not the Human**

**Warren, ‘18** (Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Coda: Adieu to the Human,” pp. 170-171, ZW)

What I am suggesting, ultimately, is that black **~~being~~** begins to get over the human and its humanism fantasies. **We’ve tried everything: from marches, to masochistic citizenship** (giving our bodies to the state to brutalize in hopes of evoking sympathy and empathy from humans), **to exceptional citizenship and respectability, to protest and armed conflict; in the end, either we will continue this degrading quest for human rights and incorporation or we will take a leap of faith**, as Kierkegaard might say, **and reject the terms through which we organize our existence. By abandoning the human, human-ness, and the liberal humanism that enshrouds it, we can better understand the violent formations of antiblackness, particularly ontological terror**. **To abandon the human does not mean that one accepts the terms of inferiority or worthlessness.** We do not have to abandon within the axiological framework of humanism; **we can reject that framework as well**. In other words, **we have invested unbelievable value in the human**—it constitutes the ***highest*** value in the world. **And** for this reason, **we are terrified of letting go of it because we believe this value will protect us against antiblackness (it will not). As long as we continue to invest in the value structure that renders the human the highest, and most important, being within the world, we will continue to plead for recognition and acceptance.** It is this ***terror*** of value, of not possessing this value, that keeps us wedded to the idea of the human and its accouterments (and I must say, **constantly revisiting the human, reimagining it, expanding it, and refashioning it does nothing but keep us entangled in the circuit of misery).** This entanglement of value and ontology produces tremendous misery and disappointment for blackness. As Rinaldo Walcott perspicuously states, “**What it means to be Human is continually defined against [blacks]. The very basic terms of social Human engagement are shaped by antiblack logics so deeply embedded in various normativities that they resist intelligibility as modes of thought and yet we must attempt to think them**.”2 We must question the antiblack logics grounding the human, even if such thinking is rendered unintelligible by metaphysical knowledge formations and traditions. **Black thinking, then, must think what is impossible to think within the constraints of metaphysics and ontology. Our enterprise broaches the unknown, the place where we can no longer ask questions, and there sits in this space**. Perhaps **what I am suggesting constitutes an ontological revolution, one that will destroy the world and its institutions** (i.e., the “end of the world,” as Fanon calls it). But these are our options, since **the metaphysical holocaust will continue as long as the world exists.** **The nihilistic revelation, however, is that such a revolution will destroy all life—far from the freedom dreams of the political idealists or the sobriety of the pragmatist.**

**Non-Black allies incarcerate Black demands similar to the way that police incarcerate Black bodies. This is an independent reason to vote for us and decks all perm solvency Wilderson 2021**

[Frank Wilderson](https://www.thenation.com/authors/frank-wilderson/)Frank B. Wilderson III is a professor of drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, and the author of *Afropessimism*. <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/george-floyd-afropessimism/>

Now, from my coastline of old age, I see how the funeral procession of Black death that litters this landscape tells a different story. **Anti-Black racism is not a by-product of capitalism** or **patriarchy—or** even **colonialism**. **Nor is anti-Black racism** in any way **analogous to any other** paradigm of **oppression**. **Anti-Blackness is its own beast**—a conceptual framework **that cannot be analogized to** capitalism, or **any** other **ism**. Nor is it a by-product of any oppressive necessity other than its own. **The need to disavow the singularity of anti-Black violence**, **and** the impulse to **disguise Black suffering and rage** (the need, that is, to characterize anti-Black violence as “class oppression” or even “white supremacy,” for that matter, and the impulse to disguise Black suffering as “exploitation of the working class” or as a kind of suffering that’s common to all people of color),are a need and an impulse that **are shared by the police and the protester.** **Black people find ourselves trapped** in the vise grip of a pincer move **between** two juggernauts: **the state and our allies**.Black people are hemmed in by two strategies of containment that, at first blush, appear not only to have nothing in common (who in their right mind, one might ask, would equate the left and the state?) but are so hostile to each other (the left calling for [the police to be defunded](https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/defund-police-protest/) and the police characterizing protesters in the streets of Minneapolis, Portland, and New York as domestic terrorists) that it seems they couldn’t agree on lunch—much less a pincer move against Black people. The word “strategy” may be a bit misleading, because it implies the pincer move against Black people comes about through conscious, if not coordinated, efforts by the left and the state. This is not the case. **The state kills and contains Black bodies**. **The left kills and contains Black desire, erases Black cognitive map**s that explain the singularity of Black suffering, **and**, most of all, fatally **constricts the horizon of Black liberation**. There are important differences**. The nub of the anti-Blackness** that saturates these desperate strategies **lies** elsewhere—in the shared **unconscious beneath their disparate conscious act**s. In 2016, revelations from Dan Baum’s 1994 interview with Watergate co-conspirator John Ehrlichman reemerged in *Harper’s*. Ehrlichman was assistant to the president for domestic affairs under Richard Nixon—which meant he was Nixon’s drug policy adviser. As Baum [recounted to NPR](https://www.npr.org/2016/03/27/472023148/legalize-all-drugs-the-risks-are-tremendous-without-defining-the-problem): *[Ehrlichman] told me an amazing thing. I started asking him some earnest, wonky policy questions and he waved them away. He said, Can we cut the B.S.? Can I just tell you what this was all about? The Nixon campaign in ‘68 and the Nixon White House had two enemies: black people and the anti-war left…. We knew that if we could associate heroin with black people and marijuana with the hippies, we could project the police into those communities, arrest their leaders, break up their meetings and most of all, demonize them night after night on the evening news. And he looked me in the eyes and said, “Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.”* If there had ever been any doubt that the War on Drugs was a cynical political tool manufactured in the Oval Office, Ehrlichman’s confession laid such doubt to rest. But what’s most instructive is what the confession reveals about the place of Black people in the unconscious of the state. The structure of the Nixon administration’s anxiety about the white anti-war left was very different from the attitude toward Black people. Nixon and his cronies were at war with the ideas of the white left. But they were not at war with the ideas of Black people—they were at war with the embodiment of Black people, the threatening presence of Black bodies. The besetting hobble of multiracial coalitions is manifest in the ways **Black members become refugees of the coalition’s “universal” agenda**. **In** social movements dedicated, for example, to **prison abolition**, the “selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone”—to quote Noam Chomsky’s definition of how consent is manufactured and consensus enforced—and **the** way **debate is bound within premises acceptable to non-Black coalition partners**, work **to crowd out a deeper understanding of captivity and anti-Black violence** by limiting the scope of the dialogue to those aspects of state violence and captivity that non-Black coalition partners have in common with Blacks. **It’s sometimes as blunt** and straightforward **as** our coalition partners **simply telling us to “stop playing Oppression Olympics.**” In the 1980s, I taught creative writing at the Loft Literary Center in Minneapolis. The novelist Toni Cade Bambara gave a weekend workshop for teachers and advanced fiction writers. Before leaving town, she agreed to have dinner with me. During dinner, as I recall, she lamented the breakup of a coalition to fight rape in Philadelphia comprising Black women and white women. The white women had put forth a motion that they launch a campaign to educate the police about rape and how it affects their lives. The Black women were completely against this. The white women made comments about how they must try to weed out good cops from bad cops. The Black women scoffed at this. The white women said the Black women were too hasty in their rejection and had not put forth reasons that were good enough or offered an alternative plan. The meeting disintegrated, and, as Bambara lamented, so did the coalition. Twenty years after dining with Toni Cade Bambara, I began to witness different manifestations of the same conundrum that the Black women in her coalition faced. As a graduate student of critical theory and, at the same time, as an activist in San Francisco Bay coalitions dedicated to abolishing the prison-industrial complex, lobbying Congress and President Bill Clinton to pardon political prisoners who were former members of the SDS, AIM, the Black Panthers, and the FALN, or organizing (unsuccessfully) to stop the passage of legislation that would allow children as young as 14 to be prosecuted as adults and warehoused in adult prisons, I saw how episodes similar to the one Bambara had described kept repeating themselves. Our coalition partners were policed for their transgressions, and the counter-hegemonic ideas that they embodied. We were shot for breathing while Black. **Black flesh stimulates a dread more fundamental than the fear of transgressions**: the fear and loathing of Black bodies. Bambara’s coalition between white women and Black women broke down not due to some ineffable, murky misunderstanding, but because the fissures in the room revealed a structural antagonism between the women, and this revelation was too much to bear. Even though white women are positioned as victims of violence in relation to white men, they are simultaneously positioned as beneficiaries, if not perpetrators, of anti-Black violence. They are on the policed side of violence against non-Black women, but they are on the policing side of anti-Black violence. They had little enthusiasm for that conversation. Saidiya Hartman’s *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* illustrates the double bind Black slave women faced when appealing to the courts for redress in the event of rape: If the definition of the crime of rape relies upon the capacity to give consent or exercise will, then how does one make legible the sexual violation of the enslaved when that which would constitute evidence of intentionality, and thus evidence of the crime—the state of consent or willingness of the assailed—opens up a Pandora’s box in which the subject formation and object constitution of the enslaved female are no less ponderous than the crime itself or when the legal definition of the enslaved negates the very idea of “reasonable resistance”? We should read Hartman’s book as an allegory of the present, because the “Pandora’s box” is precisely what the white women in Bambara’s coalition were anxious about. **What kinds of political strategies of redress can be deployed by a sentient being who is always already outside of the political** and, most importantly, whose exile white women depend upon for their own categorical coherence? It is not just that the injury of rape does not translate for Black women in the same way it does for white women; it is that injury itself is the categorical inheritance of non-Black women—in the absence of any coherent notion of consent, the concept of injury has no representational supports within Blackness. **We are confronted by two regimes of violence that are irreconcilable**. This was the spanner in the works of that feminist coalition. More broadly, it is the spanner in the works of every multiracial coalition I’ve been a part of. But **this paradox is rarely addressed because Black people are not given the space to express how our** suffering and the violence that underwrites our **suffering is not analogous to the violence and suffering that dominates our allies.** It is as though **the collective unconscious of the coalition knows that to open that can of worms would be to face the ways in which our allies**, though enemies of the state, **remain antagonists of the Blacks.** Hartman suggests it would be more precise to say that consent is not constitutive of Black subjugation; ergo, the sexual violence against Black women cannot even be theorized as a violation. What happens, then, when Black women (and men) are raped if Blackness and consent cannot be conjoined? This is the paradox that a suffering for which there are no words presented to the coalition. But coalitions, typically, are unwilling to entertain problems that arrive without solutions. The regime of violence that structures and saturates Blacks makes us objects of accumulation, rather than alienated subjects of exploitation.The unwillingness of the white women to give the Black women space to develop their sharp refusal of the white women’s proposal (police education) into a deeper explanation as to how and why Blacks are not recognized as subjects of rights, claims, and consent was why the coalition fell apart. What do the cops and the coalitions have in common? **One flank** of the pincer **is composed of the police, the army, the prison-industrial complex, and the ancillary formations of civil society** that bestow legitimacy, such as the media and the church. **The opposite flank is the terror of our allies, who** dress us up as workers, women, gays, immigrants, or postcolonial subjects: mirror images of themselves that fulfill the **need to disavow**—and the impulse to disguise—**the singularity of Black suffering**. The stakes of this pincer move are high because they crowd out Black people’s capacity to be captured by our own imaginations. **Our allies**’ pincer move **threaten**s **the imagination and the enunciation of Black thought** and thus should not be trivialized as an ensemble of bad attitudes that can be overcome through dialogue. **This prong** of the pincer **is as constitutive of an anti-Black world as the police and the prisons.** It doesn’t simply kill or warehouse Black desire the way the state kills and warehouses the Black body. **It terrorizes us through an interdiction against Black performance, coupled with a demand for Black performance.** **The coalition craves and applauds Black energy, exuberance, and righteous indignation—as long as Black suffering doesn’t tag along**.**I**n early June, as George Floyd was laid to rest and the Third Precinct stood gutted on Lake Street where Marcus, Ray, and I had raced dreaming of a world with no 5-0, I could not believe what I saw on the news. Coalition partners, from anarchists, to socialists, to non-Black supporters of Black Lives Matter, to the Minneapolis City Council, all calling for the abolition of the police! My mind and my body surged with the same exuberance that 48 years ago had surged through the bones of a boy who loved football, chocolate, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao, when Marcus laughed, “Don’t you worry, baby, I’ma take you to a museum—they got some on display.” I grinned from ear to ear and thought, “Marcus wasn’t jivin’—it’s finally coming to pass.” But within weeks, the joke slipped back through my fingers like four decades of sand. **For one hot summer moment,** the cries of **our allies** had been authorized by the demand that Black suffering embodies; and their **political desire was animated by** a kind of **Black desire** that is normally crushed between them and the state. **That moment did not last**. “Abolish” mutated into “defund,” “defund” melted into “delay,” and **the zeitgeist shifted from unfettered Black rage to sober tutorials on** activist websites and affinity gatherings on **how to massage a message that was already massaged**, to win the hearts and minds of Middle Americans as they watched us being gunned down on Instagram and the news. **Black death,** once again, **was weaponized by our allies to incarcerate Black demands, kill Black desire, and soothe the psyches of everyone but us**. I called neither Marcus nor my grandkids. I closed my eyes and tried to see that Black, intrepid, rusty-butt boy who answered to my name. I needed to recall his optimism and his smile before he felt the world kneeling on his neck.

**We have two unreconcilable projects and this decks perm completely (cross apply on case flow as well**

**Wilderson 14**

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[Irreconcilable Anti-Blackness and Police Violence w Dr. Frank Wilderson https://imixwhatilike.org/2014/10/01/frankwildersonandantiblackness-2/](https://imixwhatilike.org/2014/10/01/frankwildersonandantiblackness-2/)

When I like, yeah I know I know I get this all the time. One of the things that I'm saying. I'll interrupt you again, Frank. I'm interrupting you one more time. I'm saying I wanted to say again I fully agree with what you're saying. I'm now looking for you literally to help me. This is a very selfish question and help me figure out how I'm going to carry this response when I hear folks respond to me when I make an attempt to make the point you've just made, so I mean you've given me the argument on the response that you would give to these folks, and again I'll just have to okay well one of the things you know that that they're going that they are going to say to you and it's I mean when I say this they're going to say this to you it doesn't mean the exact words, but it's the framework out of which they try and discipline black people is by saying that and start I just said it, you know to the negative movement and Fanon on that you know the whole thing about blackness is really narrow, and it is not allowing you to see the bigger picture, and so then we begin to feel bad because you know we don't want to be now, and we don't want to be people who don't see the bigger picture I mean that's what that's what politics is all about like political struggle is developing a theory of resistance that can be generalized now it takes some work in it and the work at is at an intellectual level is hard but it's probably more difficult at an, emotional level and this is at the emotional level colleges break down however, one of the things that I would put back to this person or this group how **is** it that **the paradigm of** post **colonialism or** the paradigm of **Marxism** is a **more essential than the paradigm** was **of anti-blackness and social death**? So in other words and **this is very difficult for an American** activist because American actors don't read. They just go out and break Starbucks went over dopers bottle that's the extent of their kind of level of intellectual politics so shifting the weight from me to the other person to actually **explain to me their theoretical apparatus** and **not just explain to me what this action in this moment is going to.** Do **explain to me your theoretical apparatus** and normally when it comes down to it you find that that the theoretical apparatus works along about four different vectors, one would be the post-colonial vector well my theoretical paratus is that colonization has done XY and Z or my theoretical apparatus is that capitalism you know at the side of the wage, relation it exploits everyone universally or ecologically,  my theoretical apparatus is that there will be we will have no world if x y&z happens or my theory of apparatus is that we are all suffering under patriarchy and **then** you **ask** them know **how did black people become part of the we?** so what you've got there is a breakdown in that the dreamscape **the structure of their desire is formulated on a conception of community which a priori is anti black** so that **they're** actually **not thinking in terms of the ways in which we suffer** and in fact, **their political projects will liberate one terrain and intensify our suffering mor**e by being parasitic on my inability to speak **and** on the energy the black energy that we lend to the to their questions which **crowd out an analysis** there's a good reason why **they can't come to this** right **because they can't stand before you and say** that **I am in my being unethical**. **They** would **say** to you know Afropessimism, for example, and those moments that cannot be resolved in Fanon for example then suggest that I am as much the antagonist as the cop or the capitalist that I am unethical in my being, and I refuse to accept that. **You black person must demonstrate** to me that **I am unethical in my actions**. **They wouldn't hold any other paradigm of oppression to that high bar,** right they wouldn't say that the white French people living in Algeria have to be destroyed because they're unethical in their actions. They would say they have to be destroyed because they are present they are here. **They wouldn't** say well you know **there are** some **good capitalists and** some **bad capitalists** **they would say the capitalist as a category has to be destroyed.** **What freaks them out about an analysis of anti-blackness is that that applies to the category of the human which means that they have to be destroyed regardless of their performance or of their morality.** That **they occupy a place of power that is completely unethical regardless of what they do** and **they're not going to do that because** what are they trying to do? **They're trying to build a better world**. What are we trying to do? **We’re trying to destroy the world** **two irreconcilable projects**

**Ontology**

**The affirmative conflates freedom with metaphysical liberty, rights, and emancipation – this conflation forgets the ontological nature of freedom and attempts to produce the impossibility of the “free black” as a syntactical battlefield upon which black bodies are displayed**

**Warren, ‘18**

(Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Introduction: The Free Black Is Nothing,” pp. 15-16, ZW)

The term free black carries tension within its structure; it brings two disparate grammars into collusion and produces an ontological catastrophe. The term black is precisely the puzzle, the great abyss, of something outside the precincts of ontology. It is a metaphysical invention, void of Being, for the purpose of securing Being for the human. It has something like existence but no recourse to the unfolding of Being or the revelation of its withdrawal. It is nothing—the nonhuman, equipment, and the mysterious. Freedom, however, is the site of this unfolding for the human; it is the condition of caring for Being and embracing its withdrawal and unfolding.16 Freedom, in other words, is a (non)relation to Being for Dasein—it propels its project (projectionality) into the world. Freedom is ontological. As Heidegger insisted in his critique of Kantian freedom (metaphysical causality), “The question concerning the essence of human freedom is the fundamental question of philosophy, in which is rooted even the question of being ... freedom is the condition of the possibility of the manifestness of the being of beings, of understanding of being.”17 **Humanism often conflates freedom with liberty, rights, and emancipation, but this conflation undermines the ontological ground, which makes any claim to freedom possible.** In other words, reducing freedom to political, social, or legal conceptions leaves the question of being unattended. Freedom exists for Being—it enables the manifestation of Being through Dasein. Our metaphysical notions of freedom also reduce antiblackness to social, political, and legal understandings, and we miss the ontological function of antiblackness—to deny the ontological ground of freedom by severing the (non)relation between blackness and Being. What I am suggesting is that our **metaphysical conceptions of freedom neglect the ontological horrors of antiblackness by assuming freedom can be attained through political, social, or legal action. This is a humanist fantasy, one that masks subjection in emancipatory rhetoric.**18 “Free black,” then, stages an impossible encounter: between the ontological (non)relation and the mysterious abyss of nothing. Put differently, it expresses a Hegelian desire of synthesis between “two warring ideas,” as Dubois might call it. We might, then, envision the encounter as a form of war, an ontological disaster from which various forms of antiblack violence emerge. “Free Black” is a grammatical and syntactical battlefield upon which dead bodies—Trayvon Martin, Renisha McBride, Michael Brown, among countless others—are displayed. We can also call this disaster the “metaphysical holocaust,” as Frantz Fanon describes it. It is the systemic and relentless wiping out of black cosmologies, histories, and frames of reference/orientation. The metaphysical holocaust is violence without end, violence constitutive of a metaphysical world. It is a “violence that continuously repositions the Black as a void of historical movement,” as Frank Wilderson describes it.19 This void and stasis of temporal linearity is precisely the nothing blacks incarnate. The term free black, then, is the syntactical reflection of the metaphysical holocaust, the violence between the terms free and black that is unresolvable.

**The affirmative’s analysis of social life conflates metaphysical agency with ontological freedom – the attempt to fit blackness into a narrative of Humanism elides the problem of ontology and retrenches the metaphysical holocaust**

**Warren, ‘18**

\*edited for “[Black]”

(Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Introduction: The Free Black Is Nothing,” pp. 17-19, ZW)

Although engaging the historiographical figure “free black” (the invention of the historiographer), this book is not intended to contribute to historiography; rather, my objective is to question the ontological ground or metaphysical infrastructure upon which such historiographies proceed.21 Antebellum free- black historiography is rich with archival discoveries, and to this my research is indebted. But we reach a problem with historical narration, or what the historiographer does with the archival material retrieved. Historiographical narration is not a philosophically neutral enterprise; it is loaded with philosophical presumptions, primarily metaphysical humanism. As Possenti asserts, “it is precisely metaphysics that keeps watch over history; not because it engulfs or digests history as irrelevant, but because it can direct history toward its goal.”22 It often proceeds without broaching the ontological question—or taking the historian Ira Berlin’s phrase slaves without masters seriously.23 When historian Dr. John Hope Franklin remarks, “The free negro [black]  as a subject for historical treatment abounds in elusive and difficult problems,” I understand these problems not just as archival but also as an inherent problem of narrating within a humanist framework.24 The research acknowledges tension between blackness and freedom (freedom often described as a set of liberties and rights, not an ontological position) but resolves this tension into a synthesis of metaphysical humanism—that is, blacks are still human, even though they experience captivity and systemic discrimination. What ground enables the historiographer to make such a claim or presume apodictically this black humanity? The research carries a philosophy of universal humanism into its reading and narration practices. Historiography reinforces philosophical humanism. It is precisely these presumptions that Ontological Terror intends to unravel. I bring the Negro [black] Question to historiography to suggest that the metaphysical holocaust destabilizes such humanism.25 We need to imagine an antimetaphysical historiography (a thinking against metaphysics), one that proceeds from the puzzle of black ~~being~~ and confronts the ontometaphysical question. Thus, my objective in this book is to introduce an ontological complication that exceeds, but also engenders discriminatory law (mandatory emigration laws in Southern states, for example), surveillance, and physical brutality (the free black whipped just like the slave) of free blacks. These antiblack tactics have been well documented, as it concerns the disciplining and subordination of free blacks. What has been neglected, however, is an analysis of what exactly happens to blacks once emancipated, or free—the transubstantiation between property and something else. Did the black become a human once free? If we answer in the affirmative, does the freedom paper undermine the being of the human, given that without it, such claim to humanity cannot be sustained? Are “masterless slaves,” as free blacks have been called, still property—property of whom? What determines the distinction between human masters and masterless slaves? Is emancipation ontological creation, and what enables the malleability of black ~~being~~? These questions, questions still remaining, build a path into a discussion of ontological complications the free black presents. Ontological Terror broaches these questions to illumine something more sinister about the condition of black ~~being~~, a condition that impacts all blacks in an antiblack world, not just the antebellum free black. The historical singularity of free blacks knots together a deep philosophical conflict between Being, blackness, and freedom—it is an extraordinary paradigm for black thinking. My hope is that historians, philosophers, and theorists will consider the free black, much more than an anomalous population, a speculative frame within which the foundations of humanism and metaphysics in general are challenged. Furthermore, my concern is not to fetishize agency or will. It is certainly the case that those ~~beings~~ we call “free blacks” experienced the world through bonds, courage, despair, friendship, and hope. These cannot be denied, but I do not think these render these beings human or answer the metaphysical question in the affirmative. No matter the bond, the act of courage, the indefatigable fortitude, or the institutions established, the metaphysical holocaust remains consistent. No political action has or ever will end it—it is necessary for the world. Thus, if we bundle certain capacities into something we call “agency,” this bundle does not undermine metaphysical violence or the exclusion of blackness from Being. The existence that provides the condition for something we might call “agency” is not human ontology and not freedom. Our desperation to incorporate blacks into a narrative of humanistic heroism often results in a disavowal of the problem of ontology, which engenders the condition against which the courageous fight in the first place. Black thinking, then, must explore what existence without Being entails. Free blacks do not inhabit the world in the way the human does—historiography proceeds as if the problem of existence has been resolved. It has not.26 My focus, here, will be on the condition of the metaphysical holocaust or its manifestations and not on individual narratives of free blacks. That work is certainly important, too, but in this project I want to read the archive to understand an ontological condition of execration.

**Also, Black ~~being~~ exists as a pure function, a living laboratory, for the human to use as a fungible tool and empty vessel for the human’s reflection on the world and itself. By perming they exploit the lack of ontological resistance that black people have in order to win the debate. This hurts debate as a whole.**

**Warren, ‘18**

\*edited for “[Black]” (Calvin L., Assistant Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Emory University, Ontological Terror, it’s a book, Duke University Press, “Chapter One: The Question of Black ~~Being~~,” pp. 46-47, ZW)

**Spillers describes black ~~being~~ as a “living laboratory,**” and we can conceptualize this laboratory as the source of availableness for modernity. A living laboratory is **a collection of instruments for carrying out ontological experimentation**, or the construction of the human self. Black ~~beings~~ constitute this irresistible source of availableness for the world. Saidiya Hartman meditates on **the ontological utility of black ~~being~~ for the human** when she states: The relation between pleasure and the possession of slave property, in both the figurative and literal senses**, can be explained** in part by the fungability of the slave—that is, the joy made possible by virtue of the replaceability and interchangeability endemic to the commodity—and **by the extensive capacities of property**—that is, the augmentation of the master subject through his embodiment in external objects and persons. Put differently, **the fungability of the commodity makes** the captive body an abstract and **empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values**; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.40 Instruments, tools, and equipment are interchangeable/replaceable; this is starkly different from human being, whose existential journey in the world renders it incalculable and unique. When I suggest that **black ~~being~~** is pure function or utility, I mean precisely the way this ~~being~~ **is used as a site of projection for the human’s desires, fantasies, and ontological narcissism**. The body that Spillers presents is a necessary invention because it is through the human’s engagement with instruments (tools and equipment) that the human comes to understand the self. **To be for the human is to serve as the empty vessel for the human’s reflection on the world and self**. In short, what I am suggesting is that **black ~~being~~ is invented** as an instrument **to serve the needs of the human’s ontological projec**t. This use, or function, exceeds involuntary labor and economic interest. **It is this particular antiblack use that philosophical discourse has neglected. The Negro** [black], as invention, **is the dirty secret of ontometaphysics**.

#### **Political Apostasy and black nihilism is the only logical and ethical response to anti blackness within the world**

**Warren,** Calvin L. “Black Nihilism and the Politics of Hope.” CR: The New Centennial Review, vol. 15, no. 1, **2015**, pp. 215–248. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/crnewcentrevi.15.1.0215. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.The **black nihilist recognizes** that relying on **the Political** and its grammar **offers nothing more than a ruse of transformation and** an **exploited hope**. Instead of atheism, the black nihilist would embrace **political apostasy**: it **is the act of abandoning or renouncing a situation of unethicality and immorality**— in this sense, **the Political itself**. The apostate is a figure that “self- excommunicates” him-/herself from a body that is contrary to its fundamental belief system. As political apostate, **the black nihilist renounces the idol of anti-blackness but refuses to** participate in the ruse of **replacing one idol with anothe**r. The Political and God—the just and true God in Carter’s analysis— are incommensurate and inimical. This is not to suggest that we can exclude God, but that any recourse to the Political results in an immorality not in alignment with Godly principles (a performative contradiction). The project to align God with the Political (political theology) will inevitably fail. **If antiblackness is contrary to our beliefs**, self-excommunication, in other words **“black nihilism,” is the only position that seems consistent**. We can **think of political apostasy**, then, **as an active nihilism when an “alternative**” political arrangement **is impossible**. When faced with the impossibility of realizing the “not-yet-social order,” political apostasy becomes an empowered hermeneutical practice; it interprets the anti-black Political symbolic as inherently wicked and rejects it both as critique and spiritual practice.

**At:**

**AT LINK TURN: Afropessimism doesn’t assume the white gaze. That is like saying Marx assumed the gaze of the capitalist by describing the relational dynamics of society. There is no fundamental difference between being a slave or socially dead and society believing that you are socially dead because the Humans are the ones who control the society paradigm and Black people cannot change that without ending the world.**

**Also At Moten and Harney:**

**Moten’s reading of the world and Blackness as fugitive has yet to escape the way Blackness is still always considered socially dead. Moten’s analysis disregards that 1) there can be social life within social death. 2) If blackness is in a perpetual fugitive state then that means that it is always fleeing anti-Blackness within the world but anti-Blackness always shows up where the Black subject is because if Black people are always escaping then it is clear that we have never fully escaped our oppression.**

**Case:**

**The lens of capitalist exploitation take the form of the existential commons on which a fundamental mystification of the tenets of accumulation and fungibility that define the Slave must occur.**

**Aarons, 16** [K. Aarons, “No Selves To Abolish: Afropessimism, Anti-Politics and the End of the World,” 2016, The Anarchist Library]//Townes

From a practical or historical point of view, the afropessimist story reaches back to Assata Shakur, to the Black Liberation Army, even all the way back to the great Nat Turner, the Dismal Swamp, the Seminole Wars, and so on. But as an explicit body of theoretical work, it begins really with Historian Orlando Patterson (despite his own liberal proclivities). Patterson argued in the early 1980’s that, contrary to Marxist assumptions, what historically defines the slave’s position in society is ultimately not the phenomenon of forced labour. Although frequent, forced labour occurs only contingently or incidentally, and not everywhere slaves are found. The slave relation, Patterson argued, is rather defined by a threefold condition: a) general dishonourment (or social death), b) natal alienation (i.e. the systematic rupture of familial and genealogical continuities), c) gratuitous or limitless violence. This threefold combination gives rise to a being experientially and socially devoid of relationality: the slave relation is a type of social relation whose product is a relationless object.3 In the late 1990s Saidiya Hartman, following on the work of cultural theorist Hortense Spillers, added to Patterson’s criteria an ontological dimension: the slave, she argues, is one who finds 3 Patterson, Orlando, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Harvard, 1982), 1-17. 4 themselves positioned in their very existence, their being-as-such, as a non-human – a captured, owned, and traded object for another. The ontological abjection of slave existence is not primarily defined by alienation and exploitation (a suffering due to the perceived loss of one’s humanity) but by accumulation and fungibility: the condition of being owned and traded, of having one’s being reduced to a being-for-the-captor. 4 Far from disappearing with the 13th amendment, or even in the post-civil rights period, afropessimists argue that the formal traits of the slave relation were reproduced and kept alive through the perpetuation of a form of social and civil death that continues to materially and symbolically locate the Black body ‘outside Humanity’. At a symbolic level, these theorists argue that the racial abjection of the slave was transferred to an ‘epidermalised’ racial construction of Blackness, which had the effect of inscribing the social death and relationless objecthood at the level of appearance itself: the slave relation now marks itself within the being-as-such of Blackness. Blacks today continue to be constitutively denied symbolic membership within White civil society (both culturally and politically), in such a way that no analogical bridge to White culture exists through which Blacks could conceivably wage a ‘war of position’ or sue for the sort of junior partner status otherwise accorded to White women, non-Black people of colour, or ‘dutiful’ immigrants. The symbolic death or exclusion of Blackness from Humanism means that it is not ‘Whiteness’ or White supremacy, but ‘Humanity’ as an ontologically anti-Black structure as such, which stands in antagonism with Black bodies, since Humanity’s self-understanding of its own subjecthood as value is coherent only so long as it is measured against the killable and warehousable objecthood of Black flesh. At a corporeal level, the subjection of the Black body to direct relations of force has been institutionally carried forward through institutional paradigms of convict leasing, police impunity and mass incarceration. Throughout, Black bodies continue to be marked by a constitutive rather than contingent experience of direct material violence. Prior to any transgression, the Black body is subsumed by relations of direct force that do not possess the same sort of logical or instrumental coherence characterising the exploitation of wage labourers by capital, for example. The physical violence marking Black bodies is continuous with the slave relation, in that it remains basically despotic and gratuitous, awaiting no legitimate cause or justification, open to limitless expression, and enjoying institutional impunity. Modernity is therefore fundamentally organised around a ‘double register’.5 On the one hand, those included within civil society are subjected to a ‘contingent, ideological exploitation by variable capital’ (a regime of hegemony or exploitation). Yet this hegemonic exploitation nonetheless tends to preserve for the non-Black worker an existential commons that places symbolic limits on their degradation. For example, even where they may be criminalised, as in the ‘bloody legislation against vagabondage’ described by Marx in the first volume of Capital, still a transgression is always logically necessary for this criminalisation to take place, and hence the violence never seeps 4 Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of Subjection, (Oxford, 1997), 7, 21, 26: ‘[T]he value of blackness resided in its metaphorical aptitude, whether literally understood as the fungibility of the commodity or understood as the imaginative surface upon which the master and the nation came to understand themselves. […] [T]he fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values; and, as property, the dispossessed body of the enslaved is the surrogate for the master’s body since it guarantees his disembodied universality and acts as the sign of his power and dominion.’ 5 Steve Martinot & Jared Sexton, ‘The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy’, Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture, 9:2. 5 into the being of the criminal per se, i.e. it never becomes ontological. In this way, a symbolic space of belonging is safeguarded within White civil society through the social reinforcement of a racialised pathos of distance, whose axiomatic was distilled by Fanon into a simple phrase: ‘simple enough one has only not to be a n[epithet]’. This horizon below which non-Blacks cannot sink without scandal is marked off by despotic direct force relations, which function as the existential border separating those who live in a de jure perpetual vulnerability to terroristic violence, and those for whom such violence could only be experienced under a de facto state of exception or subsequent to a transgression. These two distinct modalities of power do not simply emerge at the same time; rather, one conditions the other. What Martinot and Sexton describe as the ‘ignorability’ of Black death and the impunity of police murder of Black bodies provides the constitutive background for the symbolic rationality of White democracy, and the symbolic currency of social capital within it. The incoherence of Black death is the condition for the coherence of White common sense and hegemonic discourse. For this reason, the entire liberal discourse of ‘ethics’ – inasmuch as it takes place within the White discourses framed by the ‘ignorability’ of police and carceral terror – renders it totally irrelevant to Black existence.6 What Wilderson calls the ‘crisis of the existential commons’ therefore describes the constitutive gulf across which any attempt to analogise and tether White visions of emancipation to Black life are bound to stumble. The product of asymmetrical regimes of force, it renders the project of what we could call an ‘affirmative identity politics’ untenable for Black flesh. It is on the basis of this orienting problematic of social death that afropessimists attempt to demonstrate the one-sided, regional, and limited character of Marxist, anarchist, feminist, and post-colonial visions of emancipation. Each of these traditions remains external to the paradigm of Blackness because of the way in which their grammar of suffering frames the subject of revolutionary practice – the working class, the subaltern, non-Black women – on the basis of ‘mediating objects’ that allow it to analogise itself with White civil society, and which in each case are absent and unavailable to those positioned by social death. Such mediating objects can include ‘land, labour-power, and cultural artefacts (such as language and customs)’. As Wilderson writes, ‘social death is a condition, void, not of land, but of a capacity to secure relational status through transindividual objects – be those objects elaborated by land, labour, or love’.7 Since the ability to analogise or humanise oneself is the condition of a struggle in which the social coordinates of identity can serve as an orienting axis for struggle – i.e. it is the condition of any positive identity politics, wherein one seeks to valorise and augment the social standing or symbolic caché of one’s group either by recognition from the State, or by constituting a community bound together by common values, cultural and familial ties, etc. – those who struggle against oppression therefore need to consider the difference between those groups accorded a sufficient quanta of social capital to become ‘junior partners’ of White civil society and Black subjects who remain shut out of this economy of symbolic recognition

**The demands of the slave are in excess of the demands of the worker. Minor reforms only sustain anti-blackness or account for anti-blackness.**

#### **The 1AC begins with an ethos of transparency in the form of relational possibility – this orientation relies on a ruse of analogy between subjugated populations, mandating a perverse means of anti-black coalition-building which culminates in liberal diversity management and colonial deathmaking—turns case**

# Feldman 16 Keith P Feldman, assistant professor of Comparative Ethnic Studies at UC Berkeley, PhD from the University of Washington, 2016, “On Relationality, On Blackness: A Listening Post,” *Comparative Literature* Volume 68 Number 2)

# **Yet, even** as relationality garners a certain kind of scholarly momentum, countervailing tendencies caution against its universalization**.** Think of these as not simply going against the relational by positing narrow parochialisms whose object is at best a fictive autocthony**.** Rather, think of them as ante-relational: as that which enunciates**, in Yumi Pak’s words,** “outside relationality.”Such approaches recognize how the epistemological transparency of the minoritized subject is forged and honed in the longstanding expression of **what Denise Ferreira Da Silva terms Enlightenment reason’s** “raciality”: those moral statements on the contours of the “human” that oscillate between stuttering denunciation and full-throated legitimation of conquest, enslavement, dispossession, and evisceration**.** These formations of violence create the conditions of possibility for relation in the modern world precisely because they inaugurate the modern world as such**.** Revealing interconnections only as a play of visible surfaces hazards obscuring such foundational forces**.** To mobilize a critique of raciality thus requires a refusal of what Frank Wilderson calls the “ruse of analogy”: the trick such forms of commensuration play in obscuring both the generality of world-ordering violence and the specificity of captivity and embodied violation and degradation of enslavement**.** Such structuralist accounts of domination offer a critical short-circuit to any liberal or radical formulations of relationality**.** Here, Blackness emerges out of an antagonism with the unequally arrayed category of non-Blackness **(Sexton),** while formulations of indigeneity are produced through transhistorical modalities of settler colonial invasion, conquest, and transfer **(Wolfe). As Jodi Byrd underscores, indigenous claims to legal and territorial forms of sovereignty are over-written when internal colonialism marks the primary conceptual grounds from which race radical movements articulate the narrative horizons of liberation. While racial demarcation has lubricated the production of colonial knowledges as a protean marker of indigenous difference, enfolding the discourse of indigeneity into that of race casts national or tribal dreams, desires, and histories as excess, as that which falls outside the scope, outside the frame.** Projects of coalition have the propensity to unwittingly smuggle in the same erasure of anti-Blackness **(Sexton)** and settler colonial violence that the liberal state enunciates through its logic of inclusion**. In this line of thinking,** decolonization as an ongoing ethical relation to indigenous futurities falls away as the liberal state comes to manage the terms of anti-racism**. In other words, as Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang emphasize,** the terms of social justice and decolonization are essentially antagonistic; their incommensurability serves as a point of departure for research, praxis, and engagement**. The social is always already a scene of presumptive relation, and particularly relation’s ongoing iterability, transferability, and structured (if also improvised) performance (Butler). The social is where heterogeneity reckons with differentiation, where the hierarchical effects of force relations are elaborated, navigated, negotiated, contested, and transformed. Ethics are prompted by the scene of the social. But** the social, as scholarship on coloniality and social death reminds us, concomitantly signifies relation’s foundational conditionality**. That is,** the social as it has been rendered through coloniality has already been structured in advance by the elaboration of modernity’s engines of fatality: captivity, confinement, and genocide **(Rodríguez).** Coloniality iterates **what Nelson Maldonado-Torres calls** a “death-ethics of war,” wherein relation is routinely precluded by a pathological will towards conquest**.** If being in relation (a relational ontology) in the transAtlantic world is understood as both an ethics and the fashioning of a phenomenology, then the conditions of possibility for relation are the foundational worldings that are made in conquest and enslavement**.** Are these two sides to the scene of the social reconcilable? Their divergent temporalities would suggest otherwise**.** If the former has invited (or been conscripted into) the narration of progress through the linear telling of liberal democracy, the latter renders the ways the social is articulated through the production of that which is out-of-time, out-of-joint, on hold**.** Because the latter is thought to emerge out of, and reproduces, that hold**—**the site that marks the transit of captive bodies and their circulation through the space of the auction block, the plantation, the convict-lease system, the ghetto, and the prison **(Childs)—**it is foundationally and intentionally incommensurate with the place-making of the former **(McKittrick).**

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#### **The Aff is only capable of offering redress for the suffering of civil society’s junior partners, but in that moment, actively foreclose the impossible demands necessary to dismantle the antagonism that positions blackness in an ontological state of slaveness.**

# Wilderson 03. Frank Wilderson, Associate Professor of African American Studies and Drama at UC Irvine, PhD in Rhetoric and Film Studies from UC Berkeley, “The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal,” *Social Justice*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (92), War, Dissent, and Justice: A Dialogue (2003), pg. 18-19, ar

# The Black experience in this country has been a phenomenon without analog. —Eugene Genovese (Boston Review, October/ November 1993)

# There is something organic to black positionality that makes it essential to the destruction of civil society. **There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around:** there is something organic to civil society that makes it essential to the destruction of the black body. Blackness is a positionality of “absolute dereliction” **(Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society,** and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established, through hegemonic interventions. Blackness cannot become one of civil society’s many junior partners: Black citizenship, or Black civic obligation, are oxymorons.**In light of this, coalitions and social movements,** even radical social movements like **the** Prison Abolition **Movement,** bound up in the solicitation of hegemony, so as to fortify and extend the interlocutory life of civil society, ultimately accommodate only the satiable demands and finite antagonisms of civil society’s junior partners (i.e., immigrants, white women, and the working class), but foreclose upon the insatiable demands and endless antagonisms of the prison slave and the prison-slave-in-waiting. **In short,** whereas such coalitions and social movements cannot be called the outright handmaidens of white supremacy, their rhetorical structures and political desire are underwritten by a supplemental anti-Blackness.**In her autobiography,** Assata Shakur**’s comments vacillate between being interesting and insightful to painfully programmatic and “responsible.” The expository method of conveyance accounts for this air of responsibility. However, toward the end of the book, she** accounts for coalition work by way of extended narrative as opposed to exposition. We accompany her on one of Zayd Shakur’s many Panther projects with outside groups, work “dealing with white support groups who were involved in raising bail for the Panther 21 members in jail” **(Shakur, 1987: 224).** With no more than three words, her recollection becomes matter of fact and unfiltered. She writes, “i hated it.” **At the time, i felt that anything below 110th street was another country. All my activities were centered in Harlem and i almost never left it. Doing defense committee work was definitely not up my alley....** i hated standing around while all these white people asked me to explain myself, my existence, i became a master of the one-liner. **(Shakur, 1987: 224)Her hatred of this work is bound up in her anticipation, fully realized, of all the zonal violations to come when a white woman asks her if Zayd is her “panther...you know, is he your black cat?” and then runs her fingers through Assata’s hair to cop a kinky feel. Her narrative anticipates these violations-to-come at the level of the street, as well as at the level of the body.**Here is the moment in her life as a prison-slave-in-waiting, which is to say, a moment as an ordinary Black person, when she finds herself among “friends”—abolitionists, at least partners in purpose, and yet she feels it necessary to adopt the same muscular constriction, the same coiled anticipation, the same combative “one-liners” that she will need to adopt just one year later to steel herself against the encroachment of prison guards. The verisimilitude between Assata’s well-known police encounters, and her experiences in civil society’s most nurturing nook, the radical coalition, raises disturbing questions about political desire, Black positionality, and hegemony as a modality of struggle.

#### **When faced with the affirmative’s advocacy, the alternative responds not with rejection but simply the phrase “mu” – this is an unasking of the affirmative that refuses the 1AC’s political telos.**

# Wilderson and Moten 12 (Frank Wilderson, Frank B Wilderson III, associate professor of African American Studies and Drama at UC Irvine, PhD in Rhetoric and Film Studies from UC Berkeley, Fred Moten, Professor of Performance Studies at the Tisch School of the Arts at NYU, PhD from UC Berkeley, November 6 2012, Q&A from after the presentation of an early draft of “Blackness and Nothingness” at UC Irvine, transcribed from two videos: 2:29-11:02 of<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d3NW_fXun-8> and 0:00 to 7:30 of<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XWYLz36wqR8>) gz

# **Wilderson:** How should we think about the protocols of psychoanalysis that run through Fanon’s work**, given what you’ve said today about pidgin languages—**and not these protocols on their own terms, but what he does with these protocols **and what David Marriott, in particular—bringing in another perhaps-Afropessimist**? **So I’m thinking about the end of the essay “Fanon’s War,”** where Marriott says “what do you do with an unconscious that appears to hate you,” **and** I read the words “appears to hate you” in a **kind of** double-way**.** It *appears* perhaps to hate you and also that *when the unconscious appears*, it hates you**, so that** the metaphor **that you talked about that** Jared talked about in his article**—**about the guy coming on stage, intervening in the intramural space**—**is precisely how Marriott talks about the condition of the Black unconscious**.** There’s this constant dislocation that means **perhaps** it cannot become an unconscious because dislocation is such that Blackness cannot generate its own ego-ideal**. So he takes Fanon’s work and then leaves Fanon’s reading of disalienation aside to analytic work without gesturing toward prescription, if that’s what you’re doing. So I’m wondering: can this gap be calibrated or is it a gap or should we think about what you’ve done today and what Marriott does in a kind of creative tension?**

# **Moten: Well, if I understand what David’s doing and also the question, then I see the tension as less…**What psychoanalytic tools allow both Fanon and David to discover is precisely this inability or incapacity for an ego-ideal in Blackness**. And then I think** this is the place**, in my mind,** where they both would deviate from psychoanalytic protocols and practices, precisely in deviating from**—let’s say—what I would call** the normativity of Freudian prescription, which is “okay, how do we fix this?”.And the answer that **I think** they both approach is “we don’t fix this.” **That,** what instead we do, in a way that exceeds psychoanalysis**—I think—**is to first of all provide a much more accurate and thorough-going understanding and even**, you could say,** diagnosis of the ego-ideal as a kind of imposition**. And, again, I think** this is where you **can** see in Fanon, a deviation both from psychoanalytic protocol and from phenomenological protocol, where on the level of psychoanalytical protocol we would talk about the idea of an ego or ego-ideal, phenomenologically we would talk about transcendental subjectivity**.** In either case, we are barred**.** We do not have this capacity**. And then,** the normative, the prescriptive level**, from within those norms or from within the normativity** of those discourses would be “well, how do you get one?,” and they’re not interested in that, and I’m not interested in that either**. And** it doesn’t mean I’m not interested in something **I guess you talk about** under the rubric of “prescription”**—and this is where, again, David’s work, you work, Jared, Fanon allow us to see things maybe I had not understood, maybe like in Du Bois and in Douglass, and going all the way back, where I’m kinda going “okay,** what’s at stake is how to begin to provide a better understanding of **what now—the language we have now to talk about this is now is the language of absence—**what is this absence of an ego ideal?What are its features?What are its qualities?How does it work?What happens there?How does it exist as a mode of living in the world?How does it exist as a mode of study?How does it exist**, frankly, in my understanding at least,** as an alternative to the world insofar as it is constructed out of and by the impulse and the imposition of the ego-ideal, which is radically, brutally, viciously interdicted for Blacks as the void of our subjectivity? **But which, I think, the work of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault have established that it is, in a different way, by way of different means, in different forms of brutality, there’s a general interdiction. And we’ll have to talk about** this**, because I want to know what you think, because I think I might be misusing a term that for me** is **so important in your work—the notion of** *antagonism***, and distinction between antagonism and conflict, and to talk about that antagonism as** the antagonism **that** structures the relationship between Blacks and civil society, between Blacks and the world, between Blacks and what Fanon calls “the morbid universe” and its production of “the morbid body.” **And this is kind of what I was getting at in that sorta aside about “privilege.” When…when Theodore Roosevelt—nah, that’s a different thing. But what I’ll say is this: what’s at stake is recognizing what I tended to call, along with my friend Steve Harney—we write stuff together—the notion of a general antagonism. Which is to say there’s a very specific and particular antagonism that exists between Blacks and civil society, and then there’s the general antagonism that** *is* **civil society, which manifests as all the different ways in which we’ve got people who have the ego-ideal imposed upon them, who live within a political structure which utterly denies the capacity to construct this ego-ideal. Now we are barred from it and excluded from it.**

# [Video cuts to next part]

# **Moten: …which is maybe part of the reason why** Black thought attains, in general, the name of thought, itself, where what it is to think is to precisely think our way out of this imposition**. I mean and this is how come I’ve been reading kinda—and I talked a little bit about it yesterday—reading Deleuze and reading Deleuze’s stuff on Hume. It’s really about…I guess to put it in, not simpler terms, but more direct terms,** Black thought knows something about life outside of the field it is constructed by and in relation to possessive individualism**. That’s what I meant when I said in certain writings that** it’s a *general critique of the proper***. So I don’t see…the difference. If there’s a tension between** what David’s doing **and what I’m trying to do, it’s not a tension, for me. It’s more like his work** is part of that work which I depend upon **as allowing me** to get to the point where I can start trying to study what it is to exist in absence**. So** if ontology doesn’t work for us**—**if it’s interdicted, the question of the meaning of being is not our question**—**then what we do in our thought is we unask that question**.** We don’t answer it**. You know I’ve been thinking about this in relation to the whole notion of apposition, in this thing I wrote a long time ago called “Knowledge of Freedom.” It’s** when Mary Pritchard’s owner comes up to her and asks**—he found out Mary Pritchard was trying to figure out some way to buy herself, to buy her freedom—he’s like** “who are you, bitch, to think about freedom?”**. And** Mary Pritchard responds “freedom is very sweet.”She unasks the question**. In a similar sense,** in Equiano**, you sell Equiano from one captor to another, Equiano’s like on one ship—**here’s some guy who comes he’s never seen before**, right?** This guy’s like “do you know who I am?”You don’t answer that question!You don’t answer that question**.** The answer is the answer, no matter what**.** Any answer is the answer that he wants**.** Because knowing who he is is capitulation to the demand that the question imposes**: “I am not you. I am who I am because you’re that.” “Yeah I’m your master. You’ve never seen me before but you** *must* **know who I am.” And this is what’s…like mu.** That term “mu,” in Japanese philosophy, in the theological discourses around Zen Buddhism, could be translated as “nothingness”, but in Zen there’s these theological questions that come up around what constitutes Buddha-nature**.** So the question is “can a dog have Buddha-nature?” and the answer to the question is “mu,” because the answer to the question is you can’t ask the question**.** You unask the question**.** It’s an unasking of the question**.** It’s within that space of the unasking of the question of the meaning of being**.** And what we do is we refuse**.** We situate ourselves appositionally, in our movement: in apposition to the question of the problematic of ego-ideal and the world that gets constructed by it**.** That’s what **I think** Glissant is talking about when he talks about “consent not to be a single being” and the Middle Passage as the field of this consent, the hold as the space of this consent**. And of course, none of this—and I’ll try to say something about this—none of this—**the first thing you have to recognize is the *absolute incapacity* to describe the depths of the brutality that correspond to this being-barred from the ego-ideal**.** It’s like if someone said “what’s the worst thing we could do?” and then you went **like** ten steps beyond that**. But by the same token—so that** it’s not possible to describe it, there’s no language which is adequate for it**.** But **what’s interesting is that what we do…what I’m beginning to believe is that** we do have some language that’s adequate for what it is in Blackness that is irreducible to its relegation**. And this is why, again, maybe the best way to think about this is is all at the level of how we negotiate, in each of our work, the relationship between maybe a kind of artistic impulse and a critical impulse, because David’s a great poet, and poetry is, for me, the field in which we actually have some kind of…and art, more generally, is the space in which we have some way of articulating the relationship between the nothingness that is imposed, as Wallace Stevens would say “the nothingness that is not there, the nothingness that is” in that poem, “The Snow Man.” So** I wouldn’t even think about it as a tension between David and me, as just maybe **the differences between** the different ways that we both understand that tension in our work, in *our work***.** It’s not between him and me**—**the tension is there in what each of us do**.** And there’s a difference in terms of the way in which we each work that tension, and negotiate that tension**—**not resolve it, because to resolve it would be to turn off the engine**.**

**The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal Frank B Wilderson III Social Justice; 2003; 30, 2; Criminal Justice Periodicals** THERE IS SOMETHING ORGANIC TO BLACK POSITIONALITY THAT MAKES IT ESSENTIAL to the destruction of civil society. There is nothing willful or speculative in this statement, for one could just as well state the claim the other way around: There is something organic to **civil society** that **makes** it **essential** to **the destruction of the Black body**. Blackness is a positionality of "absolute dereliction" (Fanon), abandonment, in the face of civil society, and therefore cannot establish itself, or be established, through hegemonic interventions. Blackness cannot become one of civil society's many junior partners: Black citizenship, or Black civic obligation, are oxymorons. **In light of this, coalitions and social movements**, even radical social movements **like** the Prison **Abolition** Movement, **bound up in the solicitation of hegemony,** so as **to** fortify and extend the interlocutory life of civil society, ultimately **accommodate** only **the** satiable **demands** and finite antagonisms **of civil society's junior partners** (i.e., immigrants, white women, and the working class), **but foreclose upon the** insatiable **demands** and endless antagonisms **of the prison slave and the prison-slave-in-waiting.** In short, **whereas such coalitions and social movements** cannot be called the outright handmaidens of white supremacy, their rhetorical structures and political desire **are underwritten by** a supplemental **anti Blackness**. In her autobiography, Assata Shakur's comments vacillate between being interesting and insightful to painfully programmatic and "responsible." The expository method of conveyance accounts for this air of responsibility. However, toward the end of the book, she accounts for coalition work by way of extended narrative as opposed to exposition. We accompany her on one of Zayd Shakur's many Panther projects with outside groups, work "dealing with white support.  groups who were involved in raising bail for the Panther 21 members in jail" (Shakur, 1987: 224). With no more than three words, her recollection becomes matter of fact and unfiltered. She writes, "I hated it." At the time, i felt that anything below 110th street was another country. All my activities were centered in Harlem and i almost never left it. Doing defense committee work was definitely not up my alley.... i hated standing around while all these white people asked me to explain myself, my existence, i became a master of the one-liner (Shakur, 1987: 224). Her hatred of this work is bound up in her anticipation, fully realized, of all the zonal violations to come when a white woman asks her if Zayd is her "panther.. .you know, is he your black cat?" and then runs her fingers through Assata's hair to cop a kinky feel. Her narrative anticipates these violations-to-come at the level of the street, as well as at the level of the body. Here is the moment in her life as a prison-slave-in-waiting, which is to say, a moment as an ordinary Black person, when she finds herself among "friends" ? abolitionists, at least partners in purpose, and yet she feels it necessary to adopt the same muscular constriction, the same coiled anticipation, the same combative "one-liners" that she will need to adopt just one year later to steel herself against the encroachment of prison guards. The verisimilitude between Assata's well known police encounters, and her experiences in civil society's most nurturing nook, the radical coalition, raises disturbing questions about political desire, Black positionality, and hegemony as a modality of struggle. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon makes two moves with respect to civil society. First, he locates its genuine manifestation in Europe the motherland. Then, with respect to the colony, he locates it only in the zone of the settler. This second move is vital for our understanding of Black positionality in America and for understanding the, at best, limitations of radical social movements in America. For if we are to follow Fanon's analysis, and the gestures toward this understanding in some of the work of imprisoned intellectuals, then we have to come to grips with the fact that, for Black people, civil society itself rather than its abuses or shortcomings is a state of emergency. For Fanon, civil society is predicated on the Manicheasm of divided zones, opposed to each other "but not in service of a higher unity" (Fanon, 1968:38-39). This is the basis of his later assertion that the two zones produce two different "species," between which "no conciliation is possible" {Ibid.). The phrase "not in service of a higher unity" dismisses any kind of dialectical optimism for a future synthesis. In "The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy," Martinot and Sexton assert the primacy of Fanon's Manichean zones (without the promise of higher unity), even in the face of American integration facticity. Fanon's specific colonial context does not share Martinot and Sexton's historical or national context. Common to  both texts, however, is the settler/native dynamic, the differential zoning, and the gratuity (as opposed to the contingency) of violence that accrues to the blackened position. The dichotomy between white ethics [the discourse of civil society] and its irrelevance to the violence of police profiling is not dialectical; the two are incommensurable whenever one attempts to speak about the paradigm of policing, one is forced back into a discussion of particular events ? high-profile homicides and their related courtroom battles, for instance (Martinot and Sexton, 2002: 6; emphasis added). It makes no difference that in the U.S. the "casbah" and the "European" zone are laid one on top of the other. What is being asserted here is an isomorphic schematic relation the schematic interchangeability between Fanon's settler society and Martinot and Sexton's policing paradigm. For Fanon, it is the policeman and soldier (not the discursive, or hegemonic, agents) of colonialism that make one town white and the other Black. For Martinot and Sexton, this Manichean delirium manifests itself by way of **the U.S. paradigm of policing** that **(re)produces**, repetitively, **the inside/outside, t**he civil society/Black world, **by virtue of** the difference between **those bodies that do not magnetize bullets and those that do.** "Police impunity serves to distinguish between the racial itself and the elsewhere that mandates it...the distinction between those whose human being is put permanently in question and those for whom it goes without saying" (Ibid.: 8). In such a paradigm, **white people are**, ipso facto, **deputized in the face of Black people**, **whether they know it** (consciously) **or not**. Whiteness, then, and by extension civil society, cannot be solely "represented" as some monumentalized coherence of phallic signifiers, but must first be understood as a social formation of contemporaries who do not magnetize bullets. This is the essence of their construction through an ^signifying absence; their signifying presence is mani? fested by the fact that they are, if only by default, deputized against those who do magnetize bullets. In short, **white people are not simply "protected" by the police, they are** in their very corporeality **the police**. This ipso facto deputization of white people in the face of Black people accounts for Fanon's materiality, and Martinot and Sexton's Manichean delirium in America. What remains to be addressed, however, is the way in which the political contestation between civil society's junior partners (i.e., workers, white women, and immigrants), on the one hand, and white supremacist institutionality, on the other hand, is produced by, and reproductive of, a supplemental anti Blackness. Put another way: How is the production and accumulation of junior partner social capital dependent upon an anti-Black rhetorical structure and a decomposed Black body? Any serious musing on the question of antagonistic identity formation , **the mass mobilization** of which can precipitate a crisis in the institution and assumptive logic that undergird the United State of America **must come to grips with the contradictions between** the political **demands of radical social movements, such as the large prison abolition movement**, which seeks to abolish the prison-industrial complex, **and the ideological structure that underwrites its political desire**. I contend that the positionality of **Black subjectivity is at the heart of those contradictions and** that this unspoken desire **is bound up with** the **political limitations** of several naturalized and uncritically accepted categories that have their genesis mainly in the works of Antonio Gramsci, namely, work or labor, the wage, exploitation, hegemony, and civil society. I wish to theorize the symptoms of rage and resignation I hear in the words of **George Jackson**, when he **boils reform down to** a single word, "**fascism**," or in Assata's brief declaration, "i hated it," as well as in the Manichean delirium of Fanon, Martinot, and Sexton. Today, **the failure of radical social movements to embrace symptoms** of all three gestures **is tantamount to the reproduction of an anti-Black politics that** nonetheless **represents itself as being in the service of the emancipation of the Black prison slave**. By examining the strategy and structure of the Black subject's absence in, and incommensurability with, the key categories of Gramscian theory, we come face to face with three unsettling consequences: (1) The Black American subject imposes a radical incoherence upon the assumptive logic of Gramscian discourse and on today's coalition politics. In other words, s/he implies a scandal. (2) The Black subject reveals the inability of social movements grounded in Gramscian discourse to think of white supremacy (rather than capitalism) as the base and thereby calls into question their claim to elaborate a comprehensive and decisive antagonism. Stated another way, Gramscian discourse and **coalition politics** are indeed able to imagine the subject that transforms itself into a mass of antagonistic identity formations, formations that can precipitate a crisis in wage slavery, exploitation, and hegemony, but they **are asleep** at the wheel **when asked to provide enabling antagonisms toward unwaged slavery, despotism, and terror**. (3) We begin to see how Marxism suffers from a kind of conceptual anxiety. There is a desire for socialism on the other side of crisis, a society that does away not with the category of worker, but with the imposition workers suffer under the approach of variable capital. In other words, the mark of its conceptual anxiety is in its desire to democratize work and thus help to keep in place and insure the coherence of Reformation and Enlightenment foundational values of productivity and progress. This scenario crowds out other postrevolutionary possibilities, i.e., idleness. The scandal, with which the Black subject position "threatens" Gramscian and coalition discourse, is manifest in the Black subject's incommensurability with, or disarticulation of, Gramscian categories: work, progress, production, exploitation, hegemony, and historical self-awareness. Through what strategies does the  Black subject destabilize emerge as the unthought, and thus the scandal of historical materialism. How does the Black subject function within the "American desiring machine" differently than the quintessential Gramscian subaltern, the worker? Capital was kick-started by the rape of the African continent, a phenomenon that is central to neither Gramsci nor Marx. According to Barrett (2002), something about the Black body in and of itself made it the repository of the violence that was the slave trade. It would have been far easier and far more profitable to take the white underclass from along the riverbanks of England and Western Europe than to travel all the way to Africa for slaves. The theoretical importance of emphasizing this in the early 21st century is twofold. First, capital was kick-started by approaching a particular body (a black body) with direct relations of force, not by approaching a white body with variable capital. Thus, one could say that slavery is closer to capital's primal desire than is exploitation. It is a relation of terror as opposed to a relation of hegemony. Second, today, late capital is imposing a renaissance of this original desire, the direct relation of force, the despotism of the unwaged relation. This renaissance of slavery, i.e., **the reconfiguration of the prison-industrial complex has**, once again, **as its** structuring metaphor and **primary target the Black body**. The value of reintroducing the unthought category of the slave, by way of noting the absence of the Black subject, lies in the Black subject's potential for extending the demand placed on state/capital formations because its reintroduction into the discourse expands the intensity of the antagonism. In other words, **the positionality of the slave makes a demand that is in excess of the demand made by the positionality of the worker.** The worker demands that productivity be fair and democratic (Gramsci's new hegemony, Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat, in a word, socialism). In contrast, the slave demands that production stop, without recourse to its ultimate democratization. Work is not an organic principle for the slave. The absence of Black subjectivity from the crux of radical discourse is symptomatic of the text's inability to cope with the possibility that the generative subject of capitalism, the Black body of the 15th and 16th centuries, and the generative subject that resolves late capital's overaccumulation crisis, the Black (incarcerated) body of the 20th and 21 st centuries, do not reify the basic categories that structure conflict within civil society; the categories of work and exploitation. Thus, **the Black subject position in America represents a**n antagonism or **demand that cannot be satisfied through a transfer of ownership/organization of existing rubrics**. In contrast, the Gramscian subject, the worker, represents a demand that can indeed be satisfied by way of a successful war of position, which

**Leftist coalitions like socialist or communist movements police black thought and desire terrorizes Black demands which constitute a form of anti-Blackness that is just as fundamental to the world as anti-Blackness from the state.**

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Now, from my coastline of old age, I see how the funeral procession of Black death that litters this landscape tells a different story. **Anti-Black racism is not a by-product of capitalism** or **patriarchy—or** even **colonialism**. **Nor is anti-Black racism** in any way **analogous to any other** paradigm of **oppression**. **Anti-Blackness is its own beast**—a conceptual framework **that cannot be analogized to** capitalism, or **any** other **ism**. Nor is it a by-product of any oppressive necessity other than its own. **The need to disavow the singularity of anti-Black violence**, **and** the impulse to **disguise Black suffering and rage** (the need, that is, to characterize anti-Black violence as “class oppression” or even “white supremacy,” for that matter, and the impulse to disguise Black suffering as “exploitation of the working class” or as a kind of suffering that’s common to all people of color),are a need and an impulse that **are shared by the police and the protester.** **Black people find ourselves trapped** in the vise grip of a pincer move **between** two juggernauts: **the state and our allies**.Black people are hemmed in by two strategies of containment that, at first blush, appear not only to have nothing in common (who in their right mind, one might ask, would equate the left and the state?) but are so hostile to each other (the left calling for [the police to be defunded](https://www.thenation.com/article/activism/defund-police-protest/) and the police characterizing protesters in the streets of Minneapolis, Portland, and New York as domestic terrorists) that it seems they couldn’t agree on lunch—much less a pincer move against Black people. The word “strategy” may be a bit misleading, because it implies the pincer move against Black people comes about through conscious, if not coordinated, efforts by the left and the state. This is not the case. **The state kills and contains Black bodies**. **The left kills and contains Black desire, erases Black cognitive map**s that explain the singularity of Black suffering, **and**, most of all, fatally **constricts the horizon of Black liberation**. There are important differences**. The nub of the anti-Blackness** that saturates these desperate strategies **lies** elsewhere—in the shared **unconscious beneath their disparate conscious act**s. In 2016, revelations from Dan Baum’s 1994 interview with Watergate co-conspirator John Ehrlichman reemerged in *Harper’s*. Ehrlichman was assistant to the president for domestic affairs under Richard Nixon—which meant he was Nixon’s drug policy adviser. As Baum [recounted to NPR](https://www.npr.org/2016/03/27/472023148/legalize-all-drugs-the-risks-are-tremendous-without-defining-the-problem): *[Ehrlichman] told me an amazing thing. I started asking him some earnest, wonky policy questions and he waved them away. He said, Can we cut the B.S.? Can I just tell you what this was all about? The Nixon campaign in ‘68 and the Nixon White House had two enemies: black people and the anti-war left…. We knew that if we could associate heroin with black people and marijuana with the hippies, we could project the police into those communities, arrest their leaders, break up their meetings and most of all, demonize them night after night on the evening news. And he looked me in the eyes and said, “Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.”* If there had ever been any doubt that the War on Drugs was a cynical political tool manufactured in the Oval Office, Ehrlichman’s confession laid such doubt to rest. But what’s most instructive is what the confession reveals about the place of Black people in the unconscious of the state. The structure of the Nixon administration’s anxiety about the white anti-war left was very different from the attitude toward Black people. Nixon and his cronies were at war with the ideas of the white left. But they were not at war with the ideas of Black people—they were at war with the embodiment of Black people, the threatening presence of Black bodies. The besetting hobble of multiracial coalitions is manifest in the ways **Black members become refugees of the coalition’s “universal” agenda**. **In** social movements dedicated, for example, to **prison abolition**, the “selection of topics, distribution of concerns, framing of issues, filtering of information, emphasis and tone”—to quote Noam Chomsky’s definition of how consent is manufactured and consensus enforced—and **the** way **debate is bound within premises acceptable to non-Black coalition partners**, work **to crowd out a deeper understanding of captivity and anti-Black violence** by limiting the scope of the dialogue to those aspects of state violence and captivity that non-Black coalition partners have in common with Blacks. **It’s sometimes as blunt** and straightforward **as** our coalition partners **simply telling us to “stop playing Oppression Olympics.**” In the 1980s, I taught creative writing at the Loft Literary Center in Minneapolis. The novelist Toni Cade Bambara gave a weekend workshop for teachers and advanced fiction writers. Before leaving town, she agreed to have dinner with me. During dinner, as I recall, she lamented the breakup of a coalition to fight rape in Philadelphia comprising Black women and white women. The white women had put forth a motion that they launch a campaign to educate the police about rape and how it affects their lives. The Black women were completely against this. The white women made comments about how they must try to weed out good cops from bad cops. The Black women scoffed at this. The white women said the Black women were too hasty in their rejection and had not put forth reasons that were good enough or offered an alternative plan. The meeting disintegrated, and, as Bambara lamented, so did the coalition. Twenty years after dining with Toni Cade Bambara, I began to witness different manifestations of the same conundrum that the Black women in her coalition faced. As a graduate student of critical theory and, at the same time, as an activist in San Francisco Bay coalitions dedicated to abolishing the prison-industrial complex, lobbying Congress and President Bill Clinton to pardon political prisoners who were former members of the SDS, AIM, the Black Panthers, and the FALN, or organizing (unsuccessfully) to stop the passage of legislation that would allow children as young as 14 to be prosecuted as adults and warehoused in adult prisons, I saw how episodes similar to the one Bambara had described kept repeating themselves. Our coalition partners were policed for their transgressions, and the counter-hegemonic ideas that they embodied. We were shot for breathing while Black. **Black flesh stimulates a dread more fundamental than the fear of transgressions**: the fear and loathing of Black bodies. Bambara’s coalition between white women and Black women broke down not due to some ineffable, murky misunderstanding, but because the fissures in the room revealed a structural antagonism between the women, and this revelation was too much to bear. Even though white women are positioned as victims of violence in relation to white men, they are simultaneously positioned as beneficiaries, if not perpetrators, of anti-Black violence. They are on the policed side of violence against non-Black women, but they are on the policing side of anti-Black violence. They had little enthusiasm for that conversation. Saidiya Hartman’s *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America* illustrates the double bind Black slave women faced when appealing to the courts for redress in the event of rape: If the definition of the crime of rape relies upon the capacity to give consent or exercise will, then how does one make legible the sexual violation of the enslaved when that which would constitute evidence of intentionality, and thus evidence of the crime—the state of consent or willingness of the assailed—opens up a Pandora’s box in which the subject formation and object constitution of the enslaved female are no less ponderous than the crime itself or when the legal definition of the enslaved negates the very idea of “reasonable resistance”? We should read Hartman’s book as an allegory of the present, because the “Pandora’s box” is precisely what the white women in Bambara’s coalition were anxious about. **What kinds of political strategies of redress can be deployed by a sentient being who is always already outside of the political** and, most importantly, whose exile white women depend upon for their own categorical coherence? It is not just that the injury of rape does not translate for Black women in the same way it does for white women; it is that injury itself is the categorical inheritance of non-Black women—in the absence of any coherent notion of consent, the concept of injury has no representational supports within Blackness. **We are confronted by two regimes of violence that are irreconcilable**. This was the spanner in the works of that feminist coalition. More broadly, it is the spanner in the works of every multiracial coalition I’ve been a part of. But **this paradox is rarely addressed because Black people are not given the space to express how our** suffering and the violence that underwrites our **suffering is not analogous to the violence and suffering that dominates our allies.** It is as though **the collective unconscious of the coalition knows that to open that can of worms would be to face the ways in which our allies**, though enemies of the state, **remain antagonists of the Blacks.** Hartman suggests it would be more precise to say that consent is not constitutive of Black subjugation; ergo, the sexual violence against Black women cannot even be theorized as a violation. What happens, then, when Black women (and men) are raped if Blackness and consent cannot be conjoined? This is the paradox that a suffering for which there are no words presented to the coalition. But coalitions, typically, are unwilling to entertain problems that arrive without solutions. The regime of violence that structures and saturates Blacks makes us objects of accumulation, rather than alienated subjects of exploitation.The unwillingness of the white women to give the Black women space to develop their sharp refusal of the white women’s proposal (police education) into a deeper explanation as to how and why Blacks are not recognized as subjects of rights, claims, and consent was why the coalition fell apart. What do the cops and the coalitions have in common? **One flank** of the pincer **is composed of the police, the army, the prison-industrial complex, and the ancillary formations of civil society** that bestow legitimacy, such as the media and the church. **The opposite flank is the terror of our allies, who** dress us up as workers, women, gays, immigrants, or postcolonial subjects: mirror images of themselves that fulfill the **need to disavow**—and the impulse to disguise—**the singularity of Black suffering**. The stakes of this pincer move are high because they crowd out Black people’s capacity to be captured by our own imaginations. **Our allies**’ pincer move **threaten**s **the imagination and the enunciation of Black thought** and thus should not be trivialized as an ensemble of bad attitudes that can be overcome through dialogue. **This prong** of the pincer **is as constitutive of an anti-Black world as the police and the prisons.** It doesn’t simply kill or warehouse Black desire the way the state kills and warehouses the Black body. **It terrorizes us through an interdiction against Black performance, coupled with a demand for Black performance.** **The coalition craves and applauds Black energy, exuberance, and righteous indignation—as long as Black suffering doesn’t tag along**.**I**n early June, as George Floyd was laid to rest and the Third Precinct stood gutted on Lake Street where Marcus, Ray, and I had raced dreaming of a world with no 5-0, I could not believe what I saw on the news. Coalition partners, from anarchists, to socialists, to non-Black supporters of Black Lives Matter, to the Minneapolis City Council, all calling for the abolition of the police! My mind and my body surged with the same exuberance that 48 years ago had surged through the bones of a boy who loved football, chocolate, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao, when Marcus laughed, “Don’t you worry, baby, I’ma take you to a museum—they got some on display.” I grinned from ear to ear and thought, “Marcus wasn’t jivin’—it’s finally coming to pass.” But within weeks, the joke slipped back through my fingers like four decades of sand. **For one hot summer moment,** the cries of **our allies** had been authorized by the demand that Black suffering embodies; and their **political desire was animated by** a kind of **Black desire** that is normally crushed between them and the state. **That moment did not last**. “Abolish” mutated into “defund,” “defund” melted into “delay,” and **the zeitgeist shifted from unfettered Black rage to sober tutorials on** activist websites and affinity gatherings on **how to massage a message that was already massaged**, to win the hearts and minds of Middle Americans as they watched us being gunned down on Instagram and the news. **Black death,** once again, **was weaponized by our allies to incarcerate Black demands, kill Black desire, and soothe the psyches of everyone but us**. I called neither Marcus nor my grandkids. I closed my eyes and tried to see that Black, intrepid, rusty-butt boy who answered to my name. I needed to recall his optimism and his smile before he felt the world kneeling on his neck.

**The focus on exploitation of the worker cannot grapple with black non-being because exploitation occurs through the inheritance of debt which presumes a being which has the capacity to inherit. It is precisely through this capacity that the worker can still identify with the “we” of humanity.**

**Barber** (Daniel Colucciello, Department Member ICI Berlin Institute for Cultural Inquiry) **2016** (The Creation of Non-Being, Rhizome, Issue 29,<http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html>, C.A.)

[17] **A central feature of control is debt**. As Deleuze remarks, "A man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt" (Deleuze 1997: 179). The experience of the indebted man is one of endless postponement, for the creditor-debtor relation sets the terms, in the present, for the future of this relation. Otherwise put, the relation between present and future is circumscribed within the relation between creditor and debtor: to have credit is to have the future as a present creditor; to have debt is to have the future as a present debtor. The future is given credit by the present, or the future is what one is given to pay off the debt of the present. In such a relation, **the future is endlessly postponed while the present remains, endures, as credit and debt. Any negativity toward the present is foreclosed**, and so the future is never created. [18] Yet Deleuze's analysis of control, and thereby of debt, is inchoate. For this reason, it will be useful to turn to the arguments set forth in Lazzarato's recent text, The Making of the Indebted Man, which offers a thoroughgoing development of the insights of Deleuze's analysis. The usefulness of this text arises, additionally, from the fact that Lazzarato—unlike many who work in a Deleuzian vein—tends to avoid dependence on an ineliminable excess of being that is presumed to overcome the limits of the present. Rather than treat Deleuze's thought as the index of an indefatigable, constitutive power of being that guarantees political possibility, **Lazzarato attends to the ways in which control has foreclosed such possibility**. As such, Lazzarato is perhaps the best available candidate for **exemplifying Deleuzian thought without the presumption of affirmation**. [19] Lazzarato presents the indebted man as the subjective terrain of communicative capitalism's apparatus of control, and in doing so develops some of Deleuze's central claims. For instance, he observes how debt "preempts non-chronological time, each person's future as well as the future of society as a whole," and contends that debt is the "principal explanation for the strange sensation of living in a society without time, without possibility, without foreseeable rupture" (Lazzarato 2012: 46-47). Furthermore, he confirms that debt marks the appearance of capitalism's capacity to make being as such, and thus to make the future: "The power of capitalism, like the world it aims to appropriate and control, is always in the process of being made" (Lazzarato 2012: 107). [20] **Lazzarato offers a key advance on Deleuze with his emphasis on the aforementioned being-making capacity of capitalism**. Specifically, he insists that **debt is not a scientific necessity**—something that stems from autonomous economic laws—**but rather a product of power**. Debt belongs to the exercise of power, and as such it is a making of beings that are logically prior to—and thus do not gain their coherence through—any science of economy. "Measure, evaluation, and appraisal"—the means by which debt expresses and constructs itself—"all arise from the question of power, before there is any question of economics" (Lazzarato 2012: 80). It is in virtue of the centrality of power within his analysis that Lazzarato offers an additional advance: the claim that attention to the debt-relation is inseparable from attention to the Christian relation. The power at issue, Lazzarato argues, is one in which the "origin of valuation and measure is both religious and political" (Lazzarato 2012: 81). [21] Lazzarato's theorization of **capitalism as a power to make the debt-relation**—and not as a secular science regulating this relation—**leads him to introduce and emphasize the Christian valence of "debt obligations**" (Lazzarato 2012: 40-41). He argues that what makes the debt-relation hold (as its necessary, if not sufficient, condition) is obligation, and that the theorization of this obligation requires attending to the Christian character of debt. Being is made through the establishment of a creditor-debtor relation, yet **essential to this relation is the establishment of obligation**, and obligation, Lazzarato argues, is **established by Christianity** (from which capitalism inherits it). Simply put, the making of beings through debt is made through obligation, which is made through Christianity. It is along these lines that he claims **we are now "indebted to the 'god' Capital"** (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Lazzarato's analysis of the debt-relation thereby demonstrates that the power by which capitalism makes being is bound up with a power named by Christianity. Capitalist power must then be analyzed in its undividedness from Christian power, and in a way that attends to the negativity of non-being against being. Asymmetry as Analogy [22] One way of addressing this task is to think debt as inheritance—that is, to think the inheritance of Christian debt by capitalism, and in doing so to think how **a capacity of being is inherited by capitalism from Christianity**. We inherit debt, and debt requires that our future be inherited—ahead of time—as the debt enacted in the present. But it is not just that debt is inherited, it is also that **debt constitutes its inheritors as** something, as beings analogically **belonging to a "we."** Note, for instance, the collective first-person of Lazzarato's claim: "We are no longer the inheritors of original sin but rather of the debt of preceding generations" (Lazzarato 2012: 32). Who is "we"? [23] It is by way of this question that one begins to encounter a limit of Lazzarato's analysis, which I will address in a logical register before returning to the explicitly historical marks of the inheritance that he tracks. **This limit**, logically speaking, **is Lazzarato's focus on asymmetry**. He clearly observes the injustice of the debt-relation by articulating the deep asymmetry between creditor and debtor.[[11]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-11)While this observation is not incorrect, the approach to which it belongs ignores the ways in which **asymmetry remains within being**. In order for one thing to be communicated as asymmetrical with or disproportionate to another thing, these things must be analogical to one another, possessing a minimal degree of likeness or commonality. Therefore creditor and debtor, despite the extremity of their asymmetry, remain analogous to each other as beings. [24] This is to say that the debt-relation operates as a domain of analogous being, and that **Lazzarato**—by presupposing and leaving in place this domain—**fails to encounter the negativity of non-being**.[[12]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-12)Whereas asymmetry presupposes the commonality and analogical relation of beings, non-being names that which is without being, and thus without analogical relation to being(s): **something and nothing are not asymmetrical but incommensurable**. Lazzarato's critique of debt, by focusing on asymmetry, ignores this absence of analogy between being (whether positive or negative, creditor or debtor) and non-being, and so it can only amount to a modulation of being—that is, a modulation ofwe. [25] Returning to Lazzarato's history of Christian-capitalist inheritance, I contend that this modulation is evident as an apparent transmutation within the "we": we were **once the inheritors of original sin**, whereas we are **now the inheritors of debt.** Yet a deeper continuity remains, for while we are different, it is we who have undergone—and survived—discontinuity: **we are still we**. Previously we inherited original sin, whereas now we inherit debt, but we are still those who inherit—and, in virtue of this being-inherited or inheriting-being, we are something. We are we, and we remain we, across any apparent discontinuity of Christianity and capitalism, **because what remains**, what is constant, **is the capacity to inherit**. Such inheritance is not so happy, of course, for to inherit sin, or to inherit debt, is to be exploited by God or capital. Yet this structure of exploitation maintains an analogy between exploiter and exploited: we are exploited, but **precisely through this exploitation**, this inheritance of debt, we still know ourselves as we. [26] In this sense, "we" names the inherited capacity to be-something, or the capacity to inherit being. What is ultimately inherited is not debt so much as this capacity: the debt that exploits is the debt that gives being, that gives the capacity to be in analogy with other beings, and thus to participate in or communicate as we. To frame the inheritance of debt primarily in terms of its asymmetry or exploitation is thus to obscure the fact that inheritability, or the ability to inherit, is the common or communicable being underlying all asymmetry. This is to say that **Lazzarato focuses** his analysis **on the conflictual relation between beings of the anti-black world and thereby fails to address the more essential antagonism between blackness and the world**. Lazzarato remains within the being of inheritance, or within the we that underlies and guarantees the "coherence"[[13]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-13) (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 187) of asymmetrical relation, whereas **any break with the present** must be articulated according to blackness, which is without relation. [27] The break, then, **must be articulated according to the uninheritability of blackness**. For Lazzarato, however, blackness remains in "the position of the unthought" (Hartman and Wilderson 2003: 185), and this is precisely because he adheres to the universalizable horizon of the we. "Everyone is a 'debtor,' accountable to and guilty before. Capital has become the Great Creditor, the Universal Creditor" (Lazzarato 2012: 11).[[14]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-14) Yet it is clear that there are those who do not participate in the we of the indebted man.[[15]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-15) Logically prior to the domination articulated via asymmetrical relations of we (inheritance of debt), there is domination articulated as non-being: "the damned of the earth"[[16]](http://www.rhizomes.net/issue29/barber.html#footnote-16) do not inherit.

**It also means the Aff/Neg fails because reading racist and sexist violence as extrinsic effects of capital alienates people from the proletariat movement against capitalism**

**Belkhir in 1** <Jean Ait. “Marxism Without Apologies: Integrating Race, Gender, Class; A Working Class Approach” Race, Gender & Class8.2 (Apr 30, 2001): 142.>

More than ever there is a need for the continued struggle against historical social inequalities based on race, class and gender. We need to integrate racism, sexism and classism into the Marxist analysis of capitalism in which race or gender or class serves as a point of entry through which the varied forms of social inequality can and must be understood. Thus, in recognizing the centrality of race, gender and class issues in the struggle against economic inequality and exploitation and cultural subordination and domination, we will be able to avoid the dramatic mistakes of the past that considered racism, sexism and classism as divisive issues.¶ Marxism and the "Woman Question"¶ In their article Marxist Theory and the Oppression of Women, Morrissey & Stoecker (1994) argue "those who follow Marx and Engels are left with a Marxist theory that is ambiguous on whether the source of women's oppression might be independent of the source of capitalism and whether this oppression could be ended by ending capitalism alone." Feminism often suggests that Marxism produced virtually nothing of real usefulness about gender inequality and the liberation of women. For Vogel (1983): "Marx and his collaborator Engels had little to say about the emancipation of women.... For them it was a marginal problem." As a result, the sexist bias in Marxism contributed to the growth of distortions in their analysis of capitalism. In her famous article entitled: The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union, Hartman (1981) argued that: "The marriage of Marxism and feminism has been like the marriage of husband and wife depicted in English common law: Marxism and feminism are one, and that one is Marxism." As such feminists argued (e.g., Hartman, 1981), since capital and private property do not cause the inequality of women, **their abolition alone will not result in the end of gender inequality**. Only specifically feminist analysis revealed the systemic character of the patriarchal relations between men and women necessary to understand gender inequality.¶ Most women writing on feminism began with the central notion that there was a distinction between sex and gender and argued that "women" were not born, but made: the problem was culture, not nature that were at the center of women's so-called inferiority. Other feminist writers also argued that the end of capitalism or patriarchy would not necessarily end the objectification and "subordination" of women because the control was within culture and the unconscious. Some feminist theorists believe that the gender hierarchical system is more deeply embedded in the male ego and thus, the various changes in the social order have remained male dominated, whether capitalist, socialist, fascist, communist, authoritarian, or liberal. Central to the reproduction of the "inferiorisation of women" is the socialization process of children outside and inside the home where "the patriarchal ideology, that men are superior to women," are taught and, where the inferior position of women is reinforced by the churches, unions, armies, factories, offices, media, publicity, schools, etc. The extensive list of practices, such as clitoridectomy, infibulation, prostitution, pornography, rape, foot-banding, body-veiling, involuntary sterilization, and sex-object advertising, illustrate the unequal power relationship of women to men, and finally, modern Asia's anomaly; the girls who do not get born.¶ MARXISM AND THE "RACE PROBLEM."¶ Although much contemporary sociological writing concerns itself with analyses of race, theories of racial ethnic inequality have never been a priority in Marxist social science. As Geschwender & Levine (1994) reminds us: "Classical social theorists, such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, were not concerned with the race problem...The authors conclude their reviews of Classical and Recent Theoretical Developments in the Marxist Analysis of Race and Ethnicity in regretting that certain Marxist theorists make the error of denying the race problem in the U.S. For instance, Bonacich (1980) reduced racism to an **ideological adjunct to class exploitation.** Wallerstein (1972) came very close to eliminating the concept together by stripping it of any meaning independent of the exploitation process.¶ As consequence, Manning Marable (1996) argues that racism has blunted the critical faculties of white progressives from the colonial period to the present Blacks have seen an endless series of prominent white liberal and progressive allies **betray their trust and embrace the politics of white supremacy**. Marxists have always insisted that the flow of social history is determined by the relationship between subjective and objective factors -- the superstructure or ideological, cultural, and political apparatuses and the base, or forces of production. But what most American progressives and Marxists adhered to was a philosophy not of Marxism -- which also suggests that the relations between superstructure and base are reciprocal, each affecting the other -- but of economic determinism. Racism was, therefore, only part of the larger class question. Small wonder, then, that until today, **no progressive or Marxist white organizations**, Old Left or New, **had won over any significant number of black and people of color activists, intellectuals, or workers.**